Is litigation funding driving the next big wave of mass tort cases and if so, what incentives does that create? Samir Parikh and Emily Siegel join the podcast today to help us explore the $15 billion litigation finance industry. Samir, a professor of corporate and bankruptcy law at Wake Forest Law, discusses the opaque nature of some financiers and their influence on mass tort litigation, often prioritizing profit over justice. Emily shares her perspective as a senior reporter at Bloomberg Law, highlighting the growing role of key players driving opaque capital – like sanctioned Russian actors operating as hedge funds – and the potential risks involved, including national security concerns. As financiers increasingly view mass tort disputes through the prism of an asset sale, they inevitably reshape the legal landscape, trigger ethical dilemmas for attorneys, and risk flooding the system with non-meritorious claims. Despite the controversies, litigation finance can level the playing field, offering a lifeline to claimants with legitimate cases. But as more money flows into mass tort disputes, less focus is placed on justice for victims. Tune in to explore the complexities and implications of litigation funding in mass torts and find out why transparency and regulation are more crucial than ever.

Key Points From This Episode:

• How litigation funding is driving mass tort cases.
• Introducing today’s guests, Samir Parikh and Emily Siegel.
• Key players driving opaque capital, including highly aggressive private equity firms.
• Samir's explanation of opaque capital financiers' profit motives.
• Why many modern tort cases more closely resemble asset sales than litigation.
• The risks that various parties face in mass tort litigation when it is funded by opaque capital.
• Emily’s findings on how Russian billionaires are avoiding sanctions by funding lawsuits.
• Why a lack of reporting requirements for funding litigation could pose a national security risk.
• Key questions raised by the Johnson & Johnson mass tort case and the potential of a future litigation regarding “forever chemicals.”
• The Daubert Standard in mass tort claims and the impact it has on funder decisions.
• Why mass torts are particularly attractive to litigation financiers.
• Ethical obligations in mass tort cases and how the attorney-client relationship is at risk.
• The impact of litigation funding on corporate defendants.
• A reminder that many legitimate financiers do a lot of good and the value that they add.
• How legitimate litigation financiers help meritorious claimants gain access to justice.
• The biggest risks posed by the new Arizona state law regarding mass tort cases.
• An overview of non-meritorious claims threatening system integrity.
• Why robust regulations and disclosures are necessary.

Links Mentioned in Today’s Episode:

Samir Parikh

Samir Parikh on LinkedIn

Emily Siegel on LinkedIn
Bite-Sized Business Law Episode 30: The Opaque Capital Fueling Mass Tort Litigation

‘Opaque Capital and Mass Tort Financing’
'Putin’s Billionaires Dodge Sanctions by Financing Lawsuits (1)

Fordham University School of Law Corporate Law Center

Go inside this most infamous financial crime with guest Stephen Fishbein, who has argued some of the most influential insider trading cases in modern history. Almost everyone, no matter your knowledge base, has an opinion about insider trading. And most peoples’ opinions are that it’s evil. But do you know exactly what insider trading is (not even Congress has defined it) and how you are affected by it? To help us dissect insider trading law and explain why we need to recalibrate our thinking around how we prosecute this white-collar crime, distinguished trial lawyer and partner at A&O Shearman, Stephen Fishbein, joins us. Stephen begins by explaining how his early career as a federal prosecutor serves him in the work that he does today in private law. Stephen describes the law’s ever-changing definition of insider trading, why Congress has yet to provide its own definition of insider trading, Dirks v. SEC’s establishment of the baseline, how United States v. Newman changed the law, and how the Blaszczak cases revealed a different side of insider trading. We also learn about shadow insider trading and the misappropriation theory, how political ambitions inside prosecutors’ offices have shaped insider trading law in America, what the law looks like in the rest of the world, and the dangers of not doing enough research on insider trading for you and your business. To end, we take a philosophical detour to debate whether insider trading is inherently good or bad and our guest shares his thoughts on what policymakers need to be doing more of to change the way insider trading is policed.

Key Points From This Episode:

• Stephen Fishbein's professional background and how he ended up at A&O Shearman.
• How his experience as a prosecutor influences the work that he does today.
• Understanding the main features of insider trading under Rule 10b-5.
• The basics of insider trading law as established in Dirks v. SEC.
• How (and why) United States v. Newman changed the law.
• Why Congress has thus far been reluctant to provide its own definition of insider trading.
• The Blaszczak cases: a different type of insider trading.
• The correlation between shadow insider trading and the misappropriation theory.
• How political ambitions inside the U.S. Attorney's Office have shaped insider trading law.
• Insider trading law in other countries.
• Whether insider trading is right or wrong on a philosophical level.
• What American lawmakers need to be thinking more about with regard to insider trading.

Links Mentioned in Today’s Episode:
Stephen Fishbein

Stephen Fishbein on LinkedIn

A&O Shearman

‘Misappropriation Theory’

‘Title 15’

‘Dirk v. SEC’

‘United States v. Martoma’

United States v. Blaszczak I

United States v. Blaszczak II

Den of Thieves

Fordham University School of Law Corporate Law Center

Corporate boards use their expertise to advance the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. But they’re only human. What if we could create a board made up of entirely unbiased, indefatigable members who never falter and never tire? Today we explore the idea of inviting artificial intelligence into the boardroom with Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, an associate professor of law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. Sergio’s well-known paper, “Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms,” has taken on new significance with the rapid progression of AI technology. Tuning in, you’ll hear about both the risks and rewards of introducing AI into the boardroom. We delve into what Delaware law has to say about legal personhood before Sergio discusses his concerns about having AI make decisions for companies and why the lack of AI accountability is problematic. We debate the risks around AI becoming sentient, and discuss whether new laws will be introduced to allow AI inside corporate boardrooms. Tune into this fascinating and informative episode today!

Key Points From This Episode:

• Welcoming today’s guest, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci.
• How Sergio got interested in the idea of AI in the boardroom.
• How ancient Roman practices of using highly intelligent slaves translates to the use of AI in boardrooms.
• AI Governance Nirvana and how it could address the problem of agency costs.
• Why there will always be a place for humans in the boardroom.
• What Delaware law has to say about legal personhood when it comes to boards of directors.
• Sergio discusses the idea of accountability and why AI cannot be held accountable.
• Why Sergio is so concerned about AI becoming sentient.
• The effects of using AI to make decisions for companies.
• The likelihood of introducing new laws to make use of AI in boardrooms.
• Whether transparency about the use of AI in the boardroom would solve the legal roadblocks to using AI in the boardroom.

Links Mentioned in Today’s Episode:

Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci

Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci on LinkedIn

Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci on X

‘Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms’

Fordham University School of Law Corporate Law Center