In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Texas’s age-verification law for sexually explicit websites triggers only intermediate scrutiny and is constitutional because it merely imposes an incidental burden on adults’ protected speech while serving the state’s important interest in shielding children from harmful content. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

H.B. 1181 requires commercial websites where more than one-third of content is “sexual material harmful to minors” to verify visitors are 18 or older through government ID or transactional data. The First Amendment permits states to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective, and this power necessarily includes the ordinary means of enforcing age limits through verification requirements. Because no person has a First Amendment right to access obscene-to-minors content without submitting proof of age, the law directly regulates only unprotected activity. Adults retain their right to access this protected speech after verification, making any burden merely incidental rather than a direct content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny.

Under intermediate scrutiny, laws must advance important governmental interests unrelated to suppressing free speech without burdening substantially more speech than necessary. Texas’s interest in protecting children from sexually explicit content is undoubtedly important, even compelling. Age verification represents a traditional, widely-accepted method of reconciling children’s protection with adults’ access rights; similar requirements exist for in-person purchases of sexual materials and numerous other age-restricted products. The specific methods H.B. 1181 permits (government ID and transactional data) are established verification methods already used by pornographic websites and other industries. The law need not adopt the least restrictive means available, and Texas’s decision to initially target websites with higher concentrations of sexual content while excluding search engines represents a reasonable legislative choice that survives intermediate scrutiny.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that strict scrutiny should apply because H.B. 1181 directly burdens adults’ access to protected speech based on its content, and that the majority’s creation of a new “partially protected” speech category contradicts four prior Supreme Court precedents applying strict scrutiny to similar laws.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a district court issue a nationwide (universal) injunction that blocks enforcement of a federal executive order beyond the specific parties involved in the lawsuit?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue universal injunctions that prohibit enforcement of executive actions beyond the parties before the court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts possess only those equitable remedies “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time of the founding. The Court finds no historical precedent for universal injunctions in English equity courts or early American practice. English equity courts operated through party-specific proceedings, where relief was limited to those actually before the court. While bills of peace allowed courts to adjudicate rights of dispersed groups, these involved small, cohesive groups and bound all members—unlike universal injunctions that protect non-parties without binding them. The historical absence of universal injunctions until the mid-20th century confirms they fall outside traditional equitable authority.

The complete relief principle permits courts to fashion remedies that fully redress plaintiffs’ injuries, but complete relief does not equal universal relief. Courts may award relief that incidentally benefits non-parties when necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs, such as in nuisance cases where divisible relief is impossible. However, prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Order against individual plaintiffs’ children provides them complete relief without requiring nationwide application. For state plaintiffs claiming administrative and financial harms, the Court remands for lower courts to determine whether narrower injunctions could provide complete relief, such as prohibiting enforcement within plaintiff states or treating affected children as eligible for federally funded benefits.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing that courts must not expand the complete relief principle to recreate universal injunctions under a different name and that relief should be tailored to redress only plaintiffs’ particular injuries.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, warning that lax enforcement of third-party standing requirements and class certification procedures could create loopholes that undermine the Court’s holding against universal injunctions.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion explaining that while universal injunctions are improper, plaintiffs may still seek classwide preliminary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) or ask courts to set aside agency rules under the Administrative Procedure Act, and emphasizing that the Court will continue to serve as the ultimate arbiter of the interim legal status of major federal actions.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that universal injunctions have deep roots in equity’s history through bills of peace and taxpayer suits, that the Executive Order is patently unconstitutional under the Citizenship Clause, and that limiting injunctive relief will leave constitutional rights meaningful in name only for those unable to sue.

Justice Jackson authored a separate dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s decision creates an existential threat to the rule of law by allowing the Executive to violate the Constitution with respect to anyone who has not sued, effectively creating zones where executive compliance with law becomes optional rather than mandatory.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did Congress violate the Constitution in the way it delegated power to the FCC to collect Universal Service Fund money, and did the FCC violate the Constitution by letting a private, industry-controlled company make those collection decisions?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme that allows the FCC to collect “sufficient” contributions to fund universal-service programs does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Communications Act directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support universal-service programs, which sets both a floor and a ceiling on the agency’s authority. The FCC cannot raise less than what is adequate to finance the programs, but also cannot raise more than that amount. Congress provided adequate guidance by specifying whom the programs must serve (rural and high-cost areas, low-income consumers, schools, and libraries) and defining which services qualify for subsidies. To receive funding, services must be subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers, be available at affordable rates, and be essential to education, public health, or safety. These conditions create determinate standards that meaningfully constrain the FCC's discretion.

The FCC’s use of the Universal Service Administrative Company to help calculate contribution amounts also passes constitutional muster. The Administrator operates subordinately to the Commission, which appoints its Board of Directors, approves its budget, and retains final decision-making authority. While the Administrator produces initial projections of carrier revenues and Fund expenses, the Commission reviews, revises if needed, and approves these figures before setting the contribution factor. The arrangement mirrors the permissible structure approved in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, where private parties could make recommendations to a government agency that retained ultimate authority.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the outcome but emphasizing concerns about delegations to independent agencies.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, expressing skepticism about the viability of the private nondelegation doctrine as an independent constitutional principle.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, arguing that Section 254 impermissibly delegates Congress’s taxing power by failing to set a tax rate or meaningful cap on collections.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.