In this case, the court considered this issue: When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U-S-C § 1229c(d)(1)?

The case was decided on April 22, 2025.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

The case involves the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. The President issued a proclamation under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. Five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal under the Proclamation, initially seeking relief in habeas but later dismissing those claims.

The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two temporary restraining orders (TROs) preventing the removal of the named plaintiffs and a provisionally certified class of noncitizens subject to the Proclamation. The court extended the TROs for an additional 14 days. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s emergency motion to stay the orders, leading the Government to seek vacatur from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States construed the TROs as appealable injunctions and granted the Government's application to vacate the orders. The Court held that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought in habeas corpus, as the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the detainees' confinement and removal. The Court also determined that venue for such habeas petitions lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, making the District of Columbia an improper venue. The detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to seek habeas relief in the proper venue before removal. The application to vacate the District Court's orders was granted, and the TROs were vacated.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?

The case was decided on April 17, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that To state a claim under Section 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements listed in that provision itself: that a plan fiduciary knowingly caused the plan to engage in a transaction involving goods, services, or facilities with a party in interest. The plaintiff is not required to plead that the transaction does not qualify for an exemption under Section 1108. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Section 1106(a)(1)(C) establishes a clear, categorical prohibition on certain transactions between a pension plan and a party in interest. ERISA’s structure places relevant exemptions, including those for reasonable and necessary services under Section 1108(b)(2)(A), in a separate statutory provision. Because those exemptions are laid out apart from the prohibitions and refer back to conduct already defined as unlawful, they function as affirmative defenses. As a result, plan fiduciaries who wish to invoke an exemption bear the burden of pleading and proving it. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are not obliged to anticipate and refute every possible statutory or regulatory exemption.

Reading exemptions as affirmative defenses also aligns with longstanding legal principles and avoids unworkable results. Requiring plaintiffs to negate all exemptions—especially when ERISA includes 21 statutory and hundreds of regulatory exemptions—would be impractical and unfair, particularly because the relevant facts are often in the defendant’s possession. Procedural safeguards such as pleading requirements, discovery limits, and Rule 11 sanctions enable federal courts to deter and manage meritless litigation without shifting the pleading burden to plaintiffs. Consequently, only the elements in Section 1106(a)(1)(C) must be pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.

Justice Samuel Alito joined the majority opinion in full and authored a concurrence, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh joined.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

The case was decided on April 2, 2025.

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, upheld the Second Circuit's ruling that Horn's loss of employment and associated economic damages qualified as injuries to "business or property" under RICO. The majority concluded that the statute permits recovery for economic harms directly resulting from racketeering activities, even if those harms stem from personal injuries. Justice Barrett emphasized that "injured" in the context of RICO simply means "harmed," and thus, economic losses like lost wages are recoverable. citeturn0news12

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson concurred, highlighting that RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. In dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, expressed concern that this interpretation could broaden RICO's scope to include traditional personal injury claims, potentially federalizing state tort law. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented separately, suggesting the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Was the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?

The case was decided on April 2, 2025

The Court unanimously held that the FDA's decisions were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Specifically, the Court agreed with the FDA's assessment that the manufacturers failed to demonstrate that the benefits of their flavored products to adult smokers outweighed the risks to youth. This ruling reversed a prior decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had found the FDA's denials unwarranted. The Supreme Court's decision underscores the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products, particularly those appealing to younger audiences, in line with public health objectives.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?

The case was decided on March 26, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that the Gun Control Act of 1968 authorizes the ATF to regulate weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers that can be readily converted into functional firearms. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

Weapon parts kits qualify as “weapons” under the statute when they contain all necessary components to build a gun and their intended function is clear. Everyday language permits describing incomplete objects by their intended use, just as a disassembled rifle remains a “weapon.” The statute reinforces this understanding by treating starter guns as firearms even though they require modification. A kit like Polymer80’s “Buy Build Shoot,” which can be assembled in about 20 minutes using common tools, meets the law’s definition because it can be “readily converted” into a functioning firearm, just as a blocked-barrel starter gun qualifies when easily modified for live fire. While not all kits may fall under this definition, the statute clearly covers at least some, making a facial challenge to the rule invalid.

The definition of “frame or receiver” also includes partially complete versions that can be finished quickly with standard tools. Ordinary language and the statute’s serialization requirements support this reading, as identification numbers are required on unfinished frames and receivers. Law enforcement has long treated such components as regulated firearms, and even the challengers conceded that some unfinished frames fall within the law’s scope. While some objects may be too incomplete to qualify, the statute reaches at least those requiring only minimal work, making ATF’s rule facially consistent with the law. Concerns about unintended consequences under the National Firearms Act are misplaced, as the government disavowed any authority to classify AR-15 receivers as machine guns, and the doctrines of lenity and constitutional avoidance do not apply where the statute’s meaning is clear.

Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson each joined the majority opinion and also wrote separate concurring opinions.

Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each authored dissenting opinions.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor’s tax payment to the United States under 11 U-S-C § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?

The case was decided on March 26, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates sovereign immunity for the federal cause of action created by §544(b), but it does not take the additional step of abrogating sovereign immunity for whatever state-law claim supplies the “applicable law” for a trustee’s §544(b) claim.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?

The case was decided on March 21, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of 18 U-S-C §924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court.

In United States v Castleman, the Court held that “knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.” This principle applies equally to §924(c) cases where injury is caused by omission rather than affirmative action. There is no meaningful distinction between acts and omissions, as deliberately causing harm through inaction still qualifies as "using" force, just as a person can "use" rain to wash their car by leaving it outside. Moreover, murder—the prototypical “crime of violence”—has long been understood to include liability for omissions, such as when a parent refuses to feed their child, resulting in death.

Interpreting the elements clause to exclude crimes of omission would exclude traditional violent crimes from its reach, contradicting the ordinary meaning of “crime of violence” that Congress intended to capture. Additionally, the word “use” does not necessarily require affirmative action; when someone deliberately causes harm through inaction, they are employing force as their instrument to accomplish their purpose.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.