In this case, the court considered this issue: Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Texas’s age-verification law for sexually explicit websites triggers only intermediate scrutiny and is constitutional because it merely imposes an incidental burden on adults’ protected speech while serving the state’s important interest in shielding children from harmful content. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

H.B. 1181 requires commercial websites where more than one-third of content is “sexual material harmful to minors” to verify visitors are 18 or older through government ID or transactional data. The First Amendment permits states to prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective, and this power necessarily includes the ordinary means of enforcing age limits through verification requirements. Because no person has a First Amendment right to access obscene-to-minors content without submitting proof of age, the law directly regulates only unprotected activity. Adults retain their right to access this protected speech after verification, making any burden merely incidental rather than a direct content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny.

Under intermediate scrutiny, laws must advance important governmental interests unrelated to suppressing free speech without burdening substantially more speech than necessary. Texas’s interest in protecting children from sexually explicit content is undoubtedly important, even compelling. Age verification represents a traditional, widely-accepted method of reconciling children’s protection with adults’ access rights; similar requirements exist for in-person purchases of sexual materials and numerous other age-restricted products. The specific methods H.B. 1181 permits (government ID and transactional data) are established verification methods already used by pornographic websites and other industries. The law need not adopt the least restrictive means available, and Texas’s decision to initially target websites with higher concentrations of sexual content while excluding search engines represents a reasonable legislative choice that survives intermediate scrutiny.

Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that strict scrutiny should apply because H.B. 1181 directly burdens adults’ access to protected speech based on its content, and that the majority’s creation of a new “partially protected” speech category contradicts four prior Supreme Court precedents applying strict scrutiny to similar laws.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Can a district court issue a nationwide (universal) injunction that blocks enforcement of a federal executive order beyond the specific parties involved in the lawsuit?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue universal injunctions that prohibit enforcement of executive actions beyond the parties before the court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts possess only those equitable remedies “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time of the founding. The Court finds no historical precedent for universal injunctions in English equity courts or early American practice. English equity courts operated through party-specific proceedings, where relief was limited to those actually before the court. While bills of peace allowed courts to adjudicate rights of dispersed groups, these involved small, cohesive groups and bound all members—unlike universal injunctions that protect non-parties without binding them. The historical absence of universal injunctions until the mid-20th century confirms they fall outside traditional equitable authority.

The complete relief principle permits courts to fashion remedies that fully redress plaintiffs’ injuries, but complete relief does not equal universal relief. Courts may award relief that incidentally benefits non-parties when necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs, such as in nuisance cases where divisible relief is impossible. However, prohibiting enforcement of the Executive Order against individual plaintiffs’ children provides them complete relief without requiring nationwide application. For state plaintiffs claiming administrative and financial harms, the Court remands for lower courts to determine whether narrower injunctions could provide complete relief, such as prohibiting enforcement within plaintiff states or treating affected children as eligible for federally funded benefits.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing that courts must not expand the complete relief principle to recreate universal injunctions under a different name and that relief should be tailored to redress only plaintiffs’ particular injuries.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, warning that lax enforcement of third-party standing requirements and class certification procedures could create loopholes that undermine the Court’s holding against universal injunctions.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion explaining that while universal injunctions are improper, plaintiffs may still seek classwide preliminary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) or ask courts to set aside agency rules under the Administrative Procedure Act, and emphasizing that the Court will continue to serve as the ultimate arbiter of the interim legal status of major federal actions.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that universal injunctions have deep roots in equity’s history through bills of peace and taxpayer suits, that the Executive Order is patently unconstitutional under the Citizenship Clause, and that limiting injunctive relief will leave constitutional rights meaningful in name only for those unable to sue.

Justice Jackson authored a separate dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s decision creates an existential threat to the rule of law by allowing the Executive to violate the Constitution with respect to anyone who has not sued, effectively creating zones where executive compliance with law becomes optional rather than mandatory.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Did Congress violate the Constitution in the way it delegated power to the FCC to collect Universal Service Fund money, and did the FCC violate the Constitution by letting a private, industry-controlled company make those collection decisions?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme that allows the FCC to collect “sufficient” contributions to fund universal-service programs does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Communications Act directs the FCC to collect contributions that are “sufficient” to support universal-service programs, which sets both a floor and a ceiling on the agency’s authority. The FCC cannot raise less than what is adequate to finance the programs, but also cannot raise more than that amount. Congress provided adequate guidance by specifying whom the programs must serve (rural and high-cost areas, low-income consumers, schools, and libraries) and defining which services qualify for subsidies. To receive funding, services must be subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers, be available at affordable rates, and be essential to education, public health, or safety. These conditions create determinate standards that meaningfully constrain the FCC's discretion.

The FCC’s use of the Universal Service Administrative Company to help calculate contribution amounts also passes constitutional muster. The Administrator operates subordinately to the Commission, which appoints its Board of Directors, approves its budget, and retains final decision-making authority. While the Administrator produces initial projections of carrier revenues and Fund expenses, the Commission reviews, revises if needed, and approves these figures before setting the contribution factor. The arrangement mirrors the permissible structure approved in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, where private parties could make recommendations to a government agency that retained ultimate authority.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the outcome but emphasizing concerns about delegations to independent agencies.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion, expressing skepticism about the viability of the private nondelegation doctrine as an independent constitutional principle.

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, arguing that Section 254 impermissibly delegates Congress’s taxing power by failing to set a tax rate or meaningful cap on collections.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Do public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025

The Supreme Court held that Parents challenging the Montgomery County Board of Education’s introduction of certain “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with the Board’s decision to withhold parental opt outs from that instruction, are entitled to a preliminary injunction because the policy poses “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs and practices parents wish to instill. Justice Samuel Alito authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Montgomery County Board of Education introduced LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks into its elementary school English curriculum and initially allowed parents to opt their children out of related instruction. When the Board rescinded this opt-out policy, citing administrative burdens and concerns about classroom disruption, parents from diverse religious backgrounds sued. The Court applied the principle from Wisconsin v Yoder that government policies violate parents’ free exercise rights when they “substantially interfere with the religious development” of children by placing them in environments “hostile” to their religious beliefs with “pressure to conform” to contrary viewpoints. The storybooks present normative messages about same-sex marriage and gender identity that directly contradict the religious teachings these parents seek to instill. Combined with teacher guidance that encourages specific responses reinforcing these viewpoints, the curriculum creates precisely the kind of “objective danger to the free exercise of religion” that the First Amendment prohibits.

When a burden on religious exercise matches the character found in Yoder—substantial interference with parents’ ability to guide their children's religious development—strict scrutiny applies regardless of whether the policy is neutral and generally applicable. While schools have a compelling interest in maintaining an undisrupted educational environment, the Board’s no-opt-out policy fails narrow tailoring. The Board continues to permit opt-outs for other curricula, including family life and human sexuality instruction, and provides parallel programming for other student populations. The Board cannot create administrative burdens through its own curriculum design choices and then cite those burdens to justify denying constitutional rights. The availability of private school or homeschooling does not cure the constitutional violation, as public education is a public benefit that cannot be conditioned on surrendering religious exercise rights.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion arguing that the Board’s policy represents an impermissible attempt at ideological conformity comparable to that rejected in Pierce v Society of Sisters, and that sex education for young children lacks the historical pedigree necessary to override parents’ fundamental rights.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that mere exposure to ideas conflicting with religious beliefs does not constitute a Free Exercise violation under established precedent, and warning that the majority’s ruling will create administrative chaos for public schools while effectively granting religious parents a veto over curricular decisions traditionally left to democratically elected school boards.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the structure of the U-S Preventive Services Task Force violate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, and if so, is the provision that insulates the task force from the Health & Human Services secretary’s supervision severable from the rest of the statute?

The case was decided on June 27, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that members of the U-S Preventive Services Task Force are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is consistent with the Appointments Clause. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

The Secretary of HHS can remove Task Force members at will, which provides “a powerful tool for control” because officers’ “presumed desire to avoid removal” creates “here-and-now subservience.” Since Congress granted the Secretary appointment power and placed no statutory restrictions on removal, the Secretary may remove Task Force members at will. Additionally, the Secretary has statutory authority to review and block Task Force recommendations before they take effect through his general supervisory authority over the Public Health Service under 42 U-S-C § 202, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, and his rulemaking authority under § 300gg-92. The Affordable Care Act requires a minimum one-year interval before recommendations become binding, during which the Secretary can direct that recommendations not be “in effect” or establish formal review processes. Task Force members therefore “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by” the Secretary.

Congress vested appointment authority in the Secretary through two statutes read together. First, the 1999 statute gives the AHRQ Director power to “convene” the Task Force, which naturally includes appointment authority given the requirement to ensure members have “appropriate expertise.” Second, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, ratified by Congress in 1984, transfers “all functions” of Public Health Service officers to the Secretary, including the AHRQ Director's appointment power. The statutory requirement that Task Force members be “independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure” does not create for-cause removal protection or prevent secretarial supervision, but rather ensures members are not unduly influenced by outside professional affiliations and can exercise independent judgment in formulating initial recommendations, consistent with the standard model of Executive Branch adjudication.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch, arguing that Congress has not explicitly vested appointment authority in the Secretary and that Task Force members are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the Medicaid Act’s “any qualified provider” provision unambiguously confer a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider?

The case was decided on June 26, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) of the Medicaid Act does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under 42 U-S-C § 1983. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court.

Federal statutes create individual rights only in “atypical cases,” and 42 U-S-C § 1983 provides causes of action for deprivation of “rights,” not mere “benefits” or “interests.” To prove an enforceable right, plaintiffs must show the statute clearly and unambiguously uses “rights-creating terms” with “an unmistakable focus” on individuals. This is a “stringent” and “demanding” test that spending-power statutes are especially unlikely to satisfy because spending-power legislation is “much in the nature of a contract” requiring States’ voluntary and knowing consent to private suits.

Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) lacks the required clear rights-creating language. The provision states that Medicaid plans must “provide that…any individual eligible for medical assistance…may obtain such assistance from any…qualified” provider. This language addresses state duties and may benefit providers and patients, but lacks the clear “rights-creating language” found in the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act provisions upheld in Talevski. Congress knows how to create clear rights, as FNHRA shows by giving nursing-home residents “the right to choose a personal attending physician.” The any-qualified-provider provision contains no such language. The provision’s exceptions confirm this reading—States may exclude providers “convicted of a felony” and “determine” which convictions qualify, which makes sense if the provision addresses state duties to the federal government but creates problems if it confers individual rights.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion arguing that the Court should reexamine more broadly its § 1983 jurisprudence, which, he claimed, bears little resemblance to the statute as originally understood.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, arguing that the any-qualified-provider provision readily creates an enforceable right under a faithful application of the Court’s unambiguous-conferral test. She criticized the majority’s requirement that Congress mirror the specific language of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act rather than apply the established test for whether a statute unambiguously confers rights, and she warned that the decision continues a pattern of weakening Reconstruction-era civil rights protections.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provision apply to a defendant whose original sentence was imposed before the Act’s enactment, but was later vacated and resentenced after the Act took effect?

The case was decided on June 26, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that because a sentence “has...been imposed” for purposes of § 403(b) of the First Step Act only if the sentence is extant (i.e., has not been vacated), the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act’s enactment. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court.

When Congress employs the present-perfect tense (“has been imposed”), it addresses whether something has continuing relevance to the present, not merely whether it occurred as a historical fact. The present-perfect tense can refer to either “an act, state, or condition that is now completed” or “a past action that comes up to and touches the present,” but in both senses it conveys that the event in question continues to be true or valid. A sentence has been imposed for § 403(b) purposes only if it remains extant—that is, has not been vacated. This interpretation aligns with background legal principles that vacated court orders are void ab initio and lack prospective legal effect.

Background principles confirm this interpretation. When interpreting statutes, courts recognize that Congress legislates against certain unexpressed presumptions, including that vacated court orders are treated as though they never occurred. Just as defendants with vacated prior felony convictions are not precluded from possessing weapons under the federal felon-in-possession ban, § 403(b) retroactivity does not exclude those whose prior sentences have been vacated. The statute’s use of present-perfect rather than past-perfect tense, especially when adjacent provisions use simple past tense, reinforces that only past sentences with continued validity preclude application of the Act’s new penalties.

Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, arguing that the present-perfect tense in §403(b) refers to the historical fact of whether a sentence had been imposed as of the Act’s enactment date, regardless of subsequent vacatur.

The opinion is presented here in its entirety, but with citations omitted. If you appreciate this episode, please subscribe. Thank you.

In this case, the court considered this issue: Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?

The case was decided on June 26, 2025.

The Supreme Court held that Petitioner Ruben Gutierrez has standing to bring his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court.

Prisoners convicted in state court have a liberty interest in demonstrating their innocence with new evidence under state law. When states create postconviction procedures, they can create rights to other procedures essential to realizing those rights. Under Skinner v Switzer, a prisoner may bring a § 1983 due process claim alleging that a state's DNA testing statute unconstitutionally prevents him from obtaining testing, even though he cannot directly challenge state court denials of his testing motions. To bring such a suit, the prisoner must demonstrate judicial standing to sue.

The standing analysis follows Reed v Goertz, which requires three elements. First, Gutierrez adequately alleged an injury: the prosecutor's denial of access to DNA evidence. Second, prosecutor Saenz caused this injury by refusing to release evidence in his custody for testing. Third, if a federal court declares Texas’s procedures unconstitutional, that judgment would eliminate Saenz’s justification for denying testing, thereby removing the barrier between Gutierrez and the evidence. The declaratory judgment would change the parties’ legal status and redress Gutierrez’s injury by eliminating the allegedly unlawful basis for the denial.

The Fifth Circuit erred in two fundamental ways. First, it improperly focused on the limited declaratory judgment the District Court ultimately issued rather than on Gutierrez’s broader complaint. Gutierrez’s complaint challenged not just Article 64’s limitation to actual innocence claims, but multiple barriers the statute creates—including its virtually insurmountable standard for parties to crimes, its refusal to consider new evidence, and its prohibition on testing solely to challenge death eligibility. Standing depends on the allegations in the complaint, not on the particular relief a district court later grants.

Second, the Fifth Circuit wrongly transformed the redressability inquiry into speculation about whether the prosecutor would ultimately provide the evidence. Under Reed, a declaratory judgment need only eliminate the prosecutor’s reliance on the challenged provision as a justification for denying testing. The Court rejected the notion that redressability requires certainty about the ultimate outcome. That a prosecutor might find other reasons to deny testing—just as the prosecutor in Reed had multiple grounds for denial—does not defeat standing to challenge specific reasons as unconstitutional. Courts regularly allow plaintiffs to challenge improper legal grounds for discretionary decisions even when the decision-maker might reach the same result for different reasons.