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The Court held that Colorado’s ban on “conversion therapy,” as applied to a licensed counselor providing only talk therapy, likely violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the law does not merely regulate professional conduct but directly restricts what the counselor may say to clients—permitting affirming discussions of a client’s sexual orientation or gender identity while prohibiting speech that seeks to change them. Such viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and must satisfy strict scrutiny, not the deferential rational-basis review applied by the lower courts. The Court rejected the idea that “professional speech” receives lesser protection and found that Colorado’s law does not fall within any recognized exception (such as regulating conduct, commercial disclosures, or historically unprotected categories of speech). Because the Tenth Circuit applied the wrong level of scrutiny, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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The Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit courts to automatically extend a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant absconds, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s rule that treated time on the run as “tolled.” Isabel Rico’s supervised release had been set to expire in 2021, but after she absconded and later committed a state drug offense in 2022, the Ninth Circuit allowed the district court to treat that offense as a federal supervised‑release violation by deeming her term extended until her arrest in 2023. The Court rejected that approach, explaining that Congress provided specific mechanisms for extending, tolling, or revoking supervised release—and none authorize automatic extension for abscondment, which risks exceeding statutory maximums and contradicts the Act’s detailed structure. The government’s textual, precedential, and common‑law arguments failed to justify such a rule, and policy concerns about gaps in §3583(i)’s warrant requirement must be addressed by Congress, not judicial invention. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court; Justice Alito dissented.

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The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, which can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement; Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement; accordingly, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

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2nd Circuit held an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court Disagrees and Reverses the order of the 2nd Circuit.

By the Supreme Courts facts (which it was required to consider in the light least favorable to the Plaintiff Below). The officer warned Linton, and then used a simple rear wrist lock to gain compliance before shortly after needing the assistance of 2 other officers to fully carry the plaintiff below out of the capital building.

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a claim for “prospective injunctive relief ”—the use of fairer procedures in the future—may “properly be brought under §1983,” because it does not depend on showing the “in validity of a previous” sentencing decision.

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In Urias‑Orellana v. Bondi, the Supreme Court unanimously held that courts of appeals must apply the substantial-evidence standard when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that a set of facts does not amount to “persecution” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court explained that although the persecution determination involves applying legal standards to facts—a mixed question—Congress, through 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B), required deferential review of the agency’s conclusion unless the evidence compels a contrary result. In addressing the petitioners’ reliance on Wilkinson v. Garland and Guerrero‑Lasprilla v. Barr, the Court clarified that those cases concerned jurisdiction, holding that mixed questions can qualify as “questions of law” that remain reviewable despite the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions. But the Court emphasized that classifying an issue as a “question of law” for purposes of whether courts may review it at all does not determine how courts must review it once jurisdiction exists; the standard of review is instead governed by §1252(b)(4)(B), which mandates substantial-evidence deference to the agency. Applying that deferential standard, the Court affirmed the First Circuit’s decision upholding the denial of asylum because the record did not compel a finding that the threats and harm described rose to the level of persecution.

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In 1979, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) as a “body corporate and politic with corporate
succession” and constituted it as an “instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions” but “independent of any supervision or control” by the New Jersey Department of
Transportation. N. J. Stat. §27:25–4(a). The State gave NJ Transit
significant authority, including the power to make bylaws, sue and be
sued, make contracts, acquire property, raise funds, own corporate entities, adopt regulations, and exercise eminent domain powers.
§§27:25–5, 27:25–13. NJ Transit’s organic statute provides that “[n]o
debt or liability of the corporation shall . . . constitute a debt [or] liability of the State,” and that “[a]ll expenses . . . shall be payable from
funds available to the corporation.” §27:25–17. NJ Transit is governed
by a board of directors (Board). §27:25–4(b). The Governor may remove Board members and may veto Board actions; the Legislature
may veto some eminent domain actions. §§27:25–4(b), (f); §27:25–
13(h). NJ Transit is now the third largest provider of bus, rail, and
light rail transit, operating within an area that includes New Jersey,
New York City, and Philadelphia.

In 2017, Jeffrey Colt was struck by an NJ Transit bus in Midtown
Manhattan; a year later, Cedric Galette was injured when an NJ
Transit bus crashed into a car in which he was a passenger in Philadelphia. Both sued NJ Transit for negligence in their respective home
state courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both lawsuits, arguing that
it is an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite, concluding NJ
Transit is an arm of New Jersey. This Court consolidated the cases
and granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Held: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is
not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.

Read by Attorney Jake Leahy.

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It's a ruling about procedure, but they'd like you to know how they believe the Court below should rule. That Free Exercise of Religion should Trump the State of California's right to tell Schools to withold knowledge of a students' decision to transition genders from the parents of that child.