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In Clark v. Sweeney, the Supreme Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that had granted habeas relief on a theory the petitioner never raised. A Maryland jury convicted Jeremiah Sweeney of second-degree murder, and his convictions were affirmed on appeal. In postconviction proceedings, Sweeney argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request voir dire of the full jury after a juror conducted an unauthorized visit to the crime scene. State courts rejected that claim, and the federal district court likewise denied habeas relief, concluding that the state court’s application of Strickland was not objectively unreasonable.

The Fourth Circuit reversed, not on the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually asserted, but on a new theory that a combination of failures by the juror, the judge, and counsel violated Sweeney’s confrontation and jury rights. The panel ordered a new trial despite the State never having the opportunity to address that theory. A dissent criticized the majority for disregarding fundamental principles of party presentation.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit had “departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” In the Court’s view, federal courts may not grant relief on claims the petitioner did not present and that the State had no chance to contest. The case is remanded for the Fourth Circuit to evaluate only the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually pursued, under AEDPA’s deferential standards governing federal review of state adjudications of Strickland claims.

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The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court upholding the use of a physical screen that prevented a four-year-old child witness from seeing the defendant during trial. Mississippi law mandates the use of such screens for child witnesses in abuse cases. Relying on that statute, the trial court permitted the screen without taking evidence or making any case-specific finding that the arrangement was necessary to protect the witness.

On review, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the statute, combined with state constitutional victims’ rights provisions, distinguished the case from Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, which require individualized findings before limiting face-to-face confrontation. The dissent argued that those precedents squarely controlled and that the trial court failed to comply with their requirements.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that Coy and Craig govern: a deviation from face-to-face confrontation is permissible only after the trial court hears evidence and finds that testifying in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma that impairs the child’s ability to communicate. The mandatory nature of Mississippi’s statute could not substitute for those constitutional findings, and the trial court’s reliance on the statute alone was insufficient.

The Court remanded for consideration of whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Goldey v. Fields

PER CURIAM. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials.

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This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388. Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special factors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135. This case arises in a new context, and “special factors” counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148– 149. In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the “inordinately difficult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such “procedures are ‘not as effective as an individual damages remedy.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.