This episode looks at the IJN and IJA combined planning for the assault on Henderson's Field, including the naval gunfire from the Kongo and Haruna under Rear Admiral Kurita where 973 14-inch rounds were fired in 83 minutes. We also discuss the development of the Maruyama Trail for the approach march of the 2nd Sendai Division.

This episode discusses:
What happens when commanders visualise terrain from a distance rather than conduct ground reconnaissance?
How does poor mapping degrade operational planning?
How does confirmation bias infect intelligence assessment?
What is the relationship between terrain and combat power?
What munition selection tells us about the limits of naval gunfire support against land targets?
How do you maximise the effect of a fire support mission through observation planning?
What does the Henderson Field bombardment teach us about fire saturation and its psychological effects?
How does loss of aviation fuel translate directly into loss of air superiority?
What is the danger of planning based on the timeline you want rather than the timeline the terrain imposes?

Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.

https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers the Command and Control and generating combined arms.

USMC 1st Marine Division vs the IJA 2nd (Sendai) Division in the fight to control the Matanikau River.

The 3rd Battle of the Matanikau Part II - This is the tenth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episode discusses:

• 1st Marine Division Combined Arms integration at the Third Battle of the Matanikau?
• How did the loss of the Matanikau River crossing have on planning for the assault on Henderson Field?
• How did Japanese command and control failures at the battalion and regimental level contribute to their defeat at the Third Matanikau?
• What are the tactical lessons from Marine Corps fire support coordination?
• How did weather and terrain shape manoeuvre and command and control?
• How did the Marines use reverse slope positions and indirect machine gun fire to defeat Japanese delaying forces?
• What were the contrasting night combat doctrines of the USMC and the Imperial Japanese Army?
• How did delayed battlefield reporting and communications breakdown affect IJA operational decision-making?
• What is the operational significance of denying an enemy its artillery firing platforms, as demonstrated at the Third Battle of the Matanikau?
• How did Lt Gen Hyakutake manage two simultaneous campaigns — Guadalcanal and the Kokoda withdrawal — from an austere forward headquarters in October 1942?
• How did American air superiority over Henderson Field shape Japanese logistics and sea control during the Guadalcanal campaign?
• What role did intelligence integration — coast watchers, signals intercepts, and radar — play in Allied air defence during the Guadalcanal campaign?

Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.

https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers the Command and Control and generating combined arms.

Maruyama vs Vandegrift in the fight to control the Matanikau River.

The 3rd Battle of the Matanikau Part I - This is the ninth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episode discusses:

How did the Japanese plan to exploit the Second Battle of the Matanikau to set up their October 1942 offensive to retake Guadalcanal?
Why was the Matanikau River "key terrain" in the Guadalcanal Campaign for both the IJA and the US Marines defending Henderson Field?
What was Japan's concept for suppressing Henderson Field before the main assault?
What was Vandegrift's operational intent in launching the 7 October 1942 attack (Third Battle of the Matanikau), and why was it such a risk?
What was the "One Log Bridge" on the Matanikau River, and why did it matter tactically?
How did the weather have on the Matanikau operation?

Dave Holland is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcanal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for the Guadalcanal series.

https://www.patreon.com/cw/principlesofwar - if you've learnt something from this episode and you can afford it, please support the podcast at Patreon.

Great Professional Military Education for your Unit. This episode covers the operational art and importance of Offensive Action - seizing and retaining the initiative.