It was Omar Bradley who, during the campaign by Patton’s Third Army in Brittany who said to Troy Middleton, the commander of the VIII Corp who was fretting over Patton’s orders to take Brest as quickly as possible:

Some people are more concerned with the headlines and the news they'll make than the soundness of their tactics. I don't care if we get Brest tomorrow or ten days later. If we cut the peninsula, we'll get it anyhow. But we can't risk a loose hinge.

This indicated a fundamental difference between the way of war conducted by Bradley and Patton, the commander of the Third Army who had been foisted on an unhappy Bradley.

Montgomery, who had been the first to realise that the ports in Brittany no longer mattered in the war being fought against Germany after the collapse of its army after Cobra, didn’t issue an order to Bradley not to send Patton’s entire Army into Brittany to take the ports, but he did make it clear that he thought a single Corp could do the job, and with doubts that even that would be needed. So how did Bradley handle the whole Brittany thing?

Tag words: Omar Bradley; Patton’s Third Army; Troy Middleton; Brest; Brittany; Montgomery; Operation Cobra; Russell Weigley; Eisenhower’s Lieutenants; German Army; Overlord; Normandy; General John Shirley Wood; Tiger Jack; American Rommel; Quiberon Bay; Chateaubriant; Carlo d’Este; A Genius for War;

From 27 July 1944, as the Americans began to achieve a surprisingly spectacular breakout, beyond everyone’s wildest dreams as Operation Cobra gained a good head of steam, Monty perceived that the situation that had been planned for before the D-Day invasion had now totally changed. He told Alanbrooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff: the main business lies to the east.

That is the Allies armies must now race to the bridgeless Seine River to trap the German armies and prevent their escape. But that wasn’t what the pre-D-Day invasion plans had required. What to do Stick with the original planning, regardless of the reality on the ground, or race the Germans to the east?

Tag words: Operation Cobra; D-Day; Alanbrooke; Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Russell Weigley; Eisenhower’s Lieutenants; B. H. Liddell Hart; Patton; Martin Creveld; Supplying War; General Lee; COM Z; Overlord; 3rd Army; Bradley; Marshall; Eisenhower; Montgomery; War As I Knew It; Rick Atkinson; Liberation Trilogy; The Guns at Last Light; Carlo d’Este; Max Hastings; Hank Cox; John Kennedy Ohl; Supplying the Troops; Brigadier General Joseph. T. McNarney; Goldthwaite Dorr; G-4; Brehone Burke Somervell; Services of Supply; SOS; Army Service Forces; ASF; Battle of the Bulge;

Nigel Hamilton, in his book The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery, wrote about Montgomery’s concerns of the hopeless preparations being undertaken for the cross channel invasion. His concern was that no overall ground force commander had been appointed. Nigel Hamilton wrote what Monty’s feelings were about this in May 1943, more than a year before the invasion took place:

"A cross-Channel operation is being envisaged," he complained to the Director of Military Operations at the War Office; "various planning staffs are at work; no outline has been produced by the Commander who is to take charge of the operation, because no Commander has been appointed. The staff of the Commander have been appointed and they are busily engaged in planning; but none of them have fought in this war and they know nothing about the battle end of the problem," he protested. "A further point is that the Commander, when appointed, has got to create his fighting machine and train his forces for the battle. This takes time, and it is not being done.

"There seems to be no one person in England who knows what is wanted, who says so quite clearly, and who has such prestige and fighting experience that everyone will accept his opinion and get on with it. Until such a person is appointed to "take hold" of the Army in England, we will do no good.

"At present there are too many people in England who think they know what is wanted; but they all disagree with each other; and they have got the basic set-up wrong; and they bellyache about nonessentials; they do not really know what are the essentials" — at which Monty listed the essentials of modern war as he saw them: namely the need to win air superiority; the necessity for good and simple army planning; the seizing and retaining of the tactical initiative once ashore; targeting the vital hinges in the enemy's defensive layout; regrouping, if necessary, to capture or outflank those hinges; and appointing only commanders with terrific "drive" and energy.

….

Only General Marshall in Washington had the necessary vision and commitment to the cross-Channel attack to bring back to England an experienced field commander at the end of the Sicilian campaign — Omar Bradley.

Tag words: Nigel Hamilton; The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery; Monty; General Marshall; Omar Bradley; Forrest Pogue; Operation Overlord; Eisenhower; Patton; Dominick Graham; Shelford Bidwell; Coalitions, Politicians and Generals; General Alexander; Sicily; Oliver Leese; Carlo d’Este; A Genius for War; Ernie Pyle; GI General; The Soldier’s General; Operation Cobra; Falaise Gap;