CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU ET AL. v. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LTD., ET AL.

The Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc subject to the command that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, §9, cl. 7. For most federal agencies, Congress provides funding through annual appropriations. For the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, however, Congress provided a standing source of funding outside the ordinary annual appropriations process. Specifically, Congress authorized the Bureau to draw from the Federal Reserve System an amount that its Director deems “reasonably necessary to carry out” the Bureau’s duties, subject only to an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U. S. C. §§5497(a)(1), (2). In this case, several trade associations representing payday lenders and credit-access businesses challenged regulations issued by the Bureau pertaining to high-interest consumer loans on statutory and constitutional grounds. As relevant here, the Fifth Circuit accepted the associations’ argument that the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause.

Held: Congress’ statutory authorization allowing the Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the Bureau’s duties satisfies the Appropriations Clause.

(a) Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes.

(b) The associations’ three principal arguments for why the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause are unpersuasive.

51 F. 4th 616, reversed and remanded. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.

Read by RJ Dieken

Culley v. Marshall

Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “incident to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a forfeiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13 days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceedings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding preliminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioners’ claims, holding that a timely forfeiture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required.

Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Process Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.

Read by RJ Dieken.

Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy

Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must file suit “within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. §507(b). On one understanding of that limitations provision, a copyright claim “accrue[s]” when “an infringing act occurs.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670. But under an alternative view, the so-called discovery rule, a claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered,” the infringing act. Ibid., n. 4. That rule enables a diligent plaintiff to raise claims about even very old infringements if he discovered them within the three years prior to suit. In this case, respondent Sherman Nealy invoked the discovery rule to sue Warner Chappell Music for copyright infringements going back ten years. Nealy argued that his claims were timely because he first learned of the infringing conduct less than three years before he sued. In the District Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy’s claims. But it argued that, even if Nealy could sue under that rule for older infringements, he could recover damages or profits for only those occurring in the last three years. The District Court agreed. On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely claim. Held: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Act’s statute of limitations establishes a threeyear period for filing suit, which begins to run when a claim accrues (here, the Court assumes without deciding, upon its discovery). That provision establishes no separate three-year limit on recovering damages. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s remedial sections. But those provisions merely state that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. See §504(a)–(c). There is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim is entitled to damages for infringement, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Court’s decision in Petrella also does not support a three-year damages cap. There, the Court noted that the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations allows plaintiffs “to gain retrospective relief running only three years back from” the filing of a suit. 572 U. S., at 672. Taken out of context, that line might seem to address the issue here. But that statement merely described how the limitations provision worked in Petrella, where the plaintiff had long known of the defendant’s infringing conduct and so could not avail herself of the discovery rule to sue for infringing acts more than three years old. The Court did not go beyond the case’s facts to say that even if the limitations provision allows a claim for an earlier infringement, the plaintiff may not obtain monetary relief. Unlike the plaintiff in Petrella, Nealy has invoked the discovery rule to bring claims for infringing acts occurring more than three years before he filed suit. The Court granted certiorari in this case on the assumption that such claims may be timely under the Act’s limitations provision. If Nealy’s claims are thus timely, he may obtain damages for them. Pp. 4–7. 60 F. 4th 1325, affirmed. KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.

Read by Jeff Barnum.