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CyberCode Academy

CyberCode Academy

By: CyberCode Academy
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Welcome to CyberCode Academy — your audio classroom for Programming and Cybersecurity.
🎧 Each course is divided into a series of short, focused episodes that take you from beginner to advanced level — one lesson at a time.
From Python and web development to ethical hacking and digital defense, our content transforms complex concepts into simple, engaging audio learning.
Study anywhere, anytime — and level up your skills with CyberCode Academy.
🚀 Learn. Code. Secure.

You can listen and download our episodes for free on more than 10 different platforms:
https://linktr.ee/cybercode_academy
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Episodes
  • Course 42 - Mobile Malware Analysis Fundamentals | Episode 10: The Essentials of Dynamic Analysis

    Course 42 - Mobile Malware Analysis Fundamentals | Episode 10: The Essentials of Dynamic Analysis
    Sep 6 2026
    Dynamic iOS Malware Analysis — Key Takeaways
    1. Application Entry Point
      • The standard entry point for an iOS application is UIApplicationMain.
      • It initializes the application runtime and connects the application to its App Delegate, which manages important lifecycle events.
    2. Method Swizzling
      • Method swizzling allows an analyst to intercept or replace a class method at runtime.
      • In a controlled malware-analysis environment, you can hook a method responsible for a network/environment check and alter its behavior so the application follows a different execution path.
      • This can help determine what the malware would do if the expected condition were satisfied.
    3. Languages
      • Objective-C is particularly important because iOS runtime behavior and method dispatch are heavily based on Objective-C's runtime.
      • JavaScript is useful when working with Cycript to interact with and manipulate the running process.
    Overall WorkflowStatic Analysis → Identify Interesting Method → Run in Isolated/Jailbroken Lab → Attach with Cycript → Hook/Swizzle Method → Observe Behavior → Document Network/File/System ChangesThe important conceptual transition here is that static analysis tells you what the application appears capable of doing, while dynamic analysis lets you observe what it actually does at runtime.

    You can listen and download our episodes for free on more than 10 different platforms:
    https://linktr.ee/cybercode_academy
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    23 mins
  • Course 42 - Mobile Malware Analysis Fundamentals | Episode 9: Mastering Basic Static Analysis for Mobile Malware

    Course 42 - Mobile Malware Analysis Fundamentals | Episode 9: Mastering Basic Static Analysis for Mobile Malware
    Sep 5 2026
    Mobile Malware Static Analysis — Module ConclusionThis episode serves as a knowledge check and consolidation of the basic static-analysis methodology covered across both iOS and Android. The emphasis is not on learning one particular tool, but on developing a repeatable investigation process.1. iOS Static AnalysisSeveral important tools and artifacts are reinforced.class-dumpUsed primarily to extract and inspect Objective-C class information from compiled iOS binaries.It can help reveal:ClassesMethodsInterfacesApplication structureThis gives the analyst an initial picture of how an application is organized.otoolA versatile Mach-O inspection utility.For example:otool -L application can display the application's linked dynamic libraries.Other otool options can provide additional information about the Mach-O binary, making it an important first-stage reverse-engineering tool.2. Finding the iOS ExecutableThe Info.plist contains important application metadata.One useful investigation task is determining the executable associated with the application.Conceptually:IPA ↓ Payload/ ↓ Application.app/ ↓ Info.plist ↓ CFBundleExecutable ↓ Executable Name The CFBundleExecutable value identifies the main executable associated with the application bundle.3. Android Static AnalysisOn Android, the equivalent early-stage artifact is the AndroidManifest.xml.apktool is commonly used to decode an APK so that its manifest and resources can be examined.For example:apktool d application.apk -o decoded_app The resulting manifest can reveal:ActivitiesServicesBroadcast receiversContent providersPermissionsIntent filters4. Intent FiltersA particularly important Android concept is the intent-filter.Intent filters describe the types of intents that an Android component can respond to.For example, a receiver may declare an intent associated with a particular system event.This makes intent filters useful during malware analysis because they help answer:What events is this application designed to react to?For example:Intent ↓ Matching Intent Filter ↓ Android Component ↓ Application Logic This is especially important when investigating applications that react automatically to events such as incoming messages, boot events, connectivity changes, or other system broadcasts.5. The Structured Malware-Analysis MethodologyOne of the most important lessons from the entire module is that malware analysis should follow a structured methodology rather than randomly examining files and tools.A strong workflow is:1. Define the objective ↓ 2. Preserve the sample ↓ 3. Calculate hashes ↓ 4. Search online intelligence resources ↓ 5. Identify platform and file type ↓ 6. Examine metadata ↓ 7. Analyze permissions / capabilities ↓ 8. Inspect code and binaries ↓ 9. Identify suspicious artifacts ↓ 10. Build a behavioral hypothesis ↓ 11. Validate through deeper analysis Why define the objective first?Without a specific objective, malware analysis can become extremely inefficient.For example, different questions require different investigations:What does this application do?Does it communicate with a C2 server?Does it steal SMS messages?What persistence mechanism does it use?What information does it collect?The objective determines which artifacts deserve priority.6. Hashing as an Early Triage TechniqueHashing provides a convenient way to identify a malware sample.Common hashes include:md5sum sample.apk sha256sum sample.apk The hash can then be searched in authorized threat-intelligence databases.This can potentially reveal:Previous detectionsMalware family classificationsExisting researchKnown indicatorsPrevious submissionsHowever:No detection does not equal no malware.A previously unseen sample may have no reputation whatsoever.7. Using Online ResourcesOnline intelligence sources can significantly accelerate analysis.Instead of spending hours investigating an artifact that has already been studied, researchers can search existing intelligence for:File hashesDomainsIP addressesURLsMalware familiesKnown samplesDecompiled artifactsThe important skill is knowing when to leverage existing intelligence and when to perform your own analysis.8. iOS vs. Android — Quick ComparisonAreaiOSAndroidApplication packageIPAAPKMain metadataInfo.plistAndroidManifest.xmlExecutableMach-ODEX/native librariesKey toolotoolapktoolClass inspectionclass-dumpDEX decompilersComponent analysisApp metadata/runtimeActivities, Services, Receivers, ProvidersEvent handlingiOS frameworksIntent / Intent FilterPrimary static-analysis goalUnderstand binary structureUnderstand package structure and application logic9. The Bigger PictureThe module has essentially established a complete basic static-analysis foundation for both mobile platforms.iOSIPA ↓ Info.plist ↓ Executable ↓ Mach-O Analysis ↓ class-dump / otool ↓ Strings / Symbols / Libraries ↓ Behavioral Hypothesis AndroidAPK ↓ AndroidManifest.xml ↓ Permissions / Components ↓ Intent ...
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    21 mins
  • Course 42 - Mobile Malware Analysis Fundamentals | Episode 8: Static Analysis of Android Banking Trojans

    Course 42 - Mobile Malware Analysis Fundamentals | Episode 8: Static Analysis of Android Banking Trojans
    Sep 4 2026
    Android Basic Static Analysis — Advanced Study GuideThis episode demonstrates how to perform basic static analysis of Android applications, moving from initial malware triage to manifest analysis, code decompilation, and identification of suspicious functionality.1. Android Malware Analysis MethodologyAlthough Android and iOS have very different architectures, the fundamental malware-analysis methodology remains similar:Sample ↓ Identification ↓ Hashing ↓ Threat Intelligence ↓ Manifest Analysis ↓ Code Analysis ↓ Behavioral Hypothesis ↓ Dynamic Analysis The objective of static analysis is to understand as much as possible without executing the malware.2. Initial APK IdentificationThe first stage is to establish basic information about the APK.Useful checks include:File typeFile sizeCryptographic hashesExisting antivirus detectionsKnown threat intelligenceFor example:file "malware 2.apk" Hashing provides a stable identifier for the sample:md5sum "malware 2.apk" sha256sum "malware 2.apk" The resulting hashes can then be searched in authorized malware-intelligence services such as VirusTotal.Important principleA clean scan does not establish that an APK is safe. Static analysis should continue even when existing security engines report no detection.3. AndroidManifest.xml AnalysisThe AndroidManifest.xml is one of the most important artifacts in an Android investigation.An APK's manifest is normally stored in a compiled/binary representation, so tools such as apktool can be used to decode it into a human-readable form.For example:apktool d "malware 2.apk" -o malware_analysis The decoded project may contain:malware_analysis/ ├── AndroidManifest.xml ├── smali/ ├── res/ ├── assets/ └── ... The manifest can reveal:Application componentsActivitiesServicesBroadcast receiversContent providersIntent filtersRequested permissionsExported components4. Permission AnalysisPermissions can provide an early indication of an application's intended capabilities.In this lab, the APK requests permissions associated with:Reading SMSWriting SMSReceiving/intercepting SMSInstalling packagesRemoving packagesThis combination is particularly interesting for a purported banking application.However, permissions alone do not prove malicious behavior.A better analytical question is:Which parts of the code actually use these permissions, and for what purpose?That connects manifest analysis with code analysis.5. Identifying the Application's TargetThe investigation decodes the application's string resources and discovers that its name translates from Korean to "smart banking."This provides an important contextual clue.Combined with the SMS-related permissions, the analyst can begin developing a hypothesis:Korean Banking Theme + SMS Access + Device Information ↓ Potential Banking-Focused Malware The hypothesis should then be tested against the application's actual code and behavior.6. DEX AnalysisAndroid applications typically contain compiled code in DEX (Dalvik Executable) format.The primary file is often:classes.dex Static analysis can involve converting DEX bytecode into a more readable representation.A traditional workflow demonstrated in the episode is:classes.dex ↓ dex2jar ↓ JAR / Java representation ↓ JD-GUI / JEB / Procyon ↓ Pseudo-source code The resulting code is not necessarily identical to the original source code, but it can provide a useful approximation of the application's logic.7. Why Decompilation MattersManifest analysis tells you what the application declares.Decompilation helps determine what the application actually does.For example:Manifest: READ_SMS RECEIVE_SMS ↓ Code: SMSReceiver ↓ Extract SMS information ↓ Process information ↓ Potential network communication This correlation is much stronger evidence than simply observing a suspicious permission.8. SMSReceiver InvestigationOne of the most significant findings in the lab is the SMSReceiver class.A broadcast receiver associated with SMS functionality deserves particular attention because SMS can contain:Authentication codesBanking notificationsAccount alertsPassword-reset messagesTwo-factor authentication codesThe analyst therefore investigates what the receiver actually does with incoming messages.9. Device ProfilingThe SMSReceiver analysis also reveals functionality for collecting information about the device, including:SIM-related informationTelephone informationDevice characteristicsThis creates a stronger behavioral picture:SMSReceiver │ ├── Access SMS │ ├── Gather SIM information │ ├── Gather telephone information │ └── Network communication This behavior is considerably more suspicious when combined with the application's banking theme.10. Suspicious Network InfrastructureThe analysis identifies a connection to:banking1.catcat.net This domain becomes an important indicator of compromise (IOC) and a potential focus for further investigation.At this stage, the ...
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    21 mins
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