Episodios

  • 5: DC's Decline and the Search for a New Imperial Capital. Gaius and Germanicus debate where the new capital of the American Empire should be located, noting that Washington, D.C., is losing its usefulness. This parallels the Roman abandonment of Rome when i

    5: DC's Decline and the Search for a New Imperial Capital. Gaius and Germanicus debate where the new capital of the American Empire should be located, noting that Washington, D.C., is losing its usefulness. This parallels the Roman abandonment of Rome when i
    Oct 20 2025
    DC's Decline and the Search for a New Imperial Capital. Gaius and Germanicus debate where the new capital of the American Empire should be located, noting that Washington, D.C., is losing its usefulness. This parallels the Roman abandonment of Rome when it became indefensible and the imperial economy shifted east, leading Constantine to establish Constantinople. DC is troubled by a bypassed population and a shrinking federal workforce, partly due to the consolidation of AI data centers in Virginia. A shift in the capital would symbolize a dramatic transformation of American identity. Germanicus suggests Miami as a potential new capital because it already serves as the entrepôt for Latin America, fitting a potential "America First" hemispheric identity. This focus aligns with the large Hispanic influx and the migration of Northerners into strong Southern states like Florida and Texas. Just as DC was originally situated midway between the North and South colonies, the new capital must be centered where North and South meet to cement a new identity. The hosts anticipate a future hemispheric alliance where America becomes a fortress and a startup for a billion people in the 22nd century.
    1712 CAESAR







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    15 m
  • 5: The Oligarchic Motives Behind the "No Kings" Protest. Gaius and Germanicus, speaking from Londinium, discuss the contemporary "No Kings" protest occurring across the American Empire, noting the young people involved are protesting the outcome and subseque

    5: The Oligarchic Motives Behind the "No Kings" Protest. Gaius and Germanicus, speaking from Londinium, discuss the contemporary "No Kings" protest occurring across the American Empire, noting the young people involved are protesting the outcome and subseque
    Oct 20 2025
    The Oligarchic Motives Behind the "No Kings" Protest. Gaius and Germanicus, speaking from Londinium, discuss the contemporary "No Kings" protest occurring across the American Empire, noting the young people involved are protesting the outcome and subsequent actions taken following the 2024 democratic vote. While Gaius sees the protest as amateurish, Germanicus finds it rooted in deep ignorance. Germanicus emphasizes that kingship is profoundly alien to both the Roman experience (which was founded on the overthrow of kings) and the American experience, pointing out that even a Roman emperor would never call himself a king. The true American Revolution was a rebellion against Parliament, not King George III. The element that is truly sinister, however, is not the youthful protestors but the oligarchy that created the enterprise. This elite class, which feels entitled to rule and controls the ruling institutions, is threatened by the rise of "big men" (like Crassus or Pompey) supported by populism. The "No Kings" metaphor is an absurd and ahistorical tactic used by the threatened oligarchy to quash this popular movement. The hosts then turn to debating the necessity of moving the American Empire's capital, as DC's usefulness is outworn.
    1582 OTHO
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    17 m
  • 5: LONDINIUM 91 AD. Carthage, Gaza, and the Risk of Unhealable Imperial Wounds. Gaius and Germanicus open by reviewing recent international news, including a major ceasefire signing hosted by Mr. Trump and proposals for US-Russia talks in Budapest, mode

    5: LONDINIUM 91 AD. Carthage, Gaza, and the Risk of Unhealable Imperial Wounds. Gaius and Germanicus open by reviewing recent international news, including a major ceasefire signing hosted by Mr. Trump and proposals for US-Russia talks in Budapest, mode
    Oct 20 2025
    LONDINIUM 91 AD. Carthage, Gaza, and the Risk of Unhealable Imperial Wounds. Gaius and Germanicus open by reviewing recent international news, including a major ceasefire signing hosted by Mr. Trump and proposals for US-Russia talks in Budapest, moderated by Mr. Orbán. The conversation pivots to the analogy between the Roman destruction and subsequent revival of Carthage and the modern conflict in Gaza. Despite being destroyed in 146 BCE, Carthage became prosperous and essential to the Western Roman Empire's bread basket centuries later. Gaza, however, is a "wholly symbolic artifact of contention." Germanicus observes that Israel's dependence on the US to preserve its vision, which currently requires the emptying and incorporation of Gaza, tests the West's moral standards regarding the conduct of war. The hosts discuss whether reconciliation can occur over historical time. However, if Israel forces an expulsion of the people of Gaza—mirroring what the Romans did to Israel—the resulting transgression will be so great that the wound will become "codified in the very identity of the people who were wronged" and never heal. This unforgiven wrong risks the long-term disappearance of the US and Israel, much like how the memory of the Roman presence in North Africa was "expunged and wiped away."
    1569 LONDINIUM
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    22 m
  • 4: V 8. The West's 2014 Appeasement: The Failure to Respond to Crimean Annexation. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the annexation of Crimea in 2014 via "brute force" and the Western response. Professor Plokhy

    4: V 8. The West's 2014 Appeasement: The Failure to Respond to Crimean Annexation. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the annexation of Crimea in 2014 via "brute force" and the Western response. Professor Plokhy
    Oct 20 2025
    8. The West's 2014 Appeasement: The Failure to Respond to Crimean Annexation. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the annexation of Crimea in 2014 via "brute force" and the Western response. Professor Plokhy suggests that if NATO's reaction to Crimea had been commensurate with its response to the 2022 invasion, the current large-scale war might have been avoided. Instead, the West treated the annexation as an exception, comparing it to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, believing Putin would cease aggression after securing the Russian-majority region. This thinking was a mistake; for example, Germany continued pursuing Nord Stream 2, based on the failed premise that economic ties guaranteed peace. NATO's overall policy was designed to pacify Russia and avoid placing military units near its borders, resulting in NATO having "very little to respond with" when the annexation occurred. Russia quickly moved beyond Crimea, concocting uprisings in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack against Ukrainian forces in the summer of 2014. This led to the Minsk II agreements, which NATO backed. However, Russia exploited Minsk II by insisting on holding elections first under its military control—a plan intended to insert a "Trojan horse" into Ukraine's political body to destabilize it and block its Euro-Atlantic integration. This resembled the policies of appeasement seen in the 1930s.

    1855 BRITISH ARMY CRIMEA
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    10 m
  • 4: 7. Bucharest 2008 and the Failed Bid to Prevent Russian Aggression. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses how Vladimir Putin's powerful presidency, rooted in a manipulated super-presidential constitution, enabled h

    4: 7. Bucharest 2008 and the Failed Bid to Prevent Russian Aggression. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses how Vladimir Putin's powerful presidency, rooted in a manipulated super-presidential constitution, enabled h
    Oct 20 2025
    7. Bucharest 2008 and the Failed Bid to Prevent Russian Aggression. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses how Vladimir Putin's powerful presidency, rooted in a manipulated super-presidential constitution, enabled him to assert the right to dictate which countries could align with the West. The April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was a critical turning point. Though the US, led by George W. Bush, favored inviting Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance, Western allies, notably Germany, opposed the idea, leading to a split. The outcome—a promise of future membership with no specifics—was the "worst outcome possible." Putin used this weakness, starting a war in Georgia months later, effectively annexing territory and disqualifying Georgia from joining NATO due to territorial conflicts. This demonstrated that Ukraine and Georgia had exposed themselves to future Russian attacks by publicly seeking NATO membership without securing "meaningful Western support," meaning military aid. Domestically, Putin viewed the 2004 Orange Revolution, which rejected his preferred candidate Viktor Yanukovych, as a threat to his own power structure. Yanukovych later returned and, in 2013, was bribed and pressured by Russia not to sign an EU association agreement, sparking the Euromaidan Revolution which served as a stepping stone toward the 2014 Crimean annexation.
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    8 m
  • 4: 6. The Dictatorial Power of Putin and the Unification of Ukraine Post-2014. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the unilateral nature of decision-making in the Kremlin regarding the 2014 invasion. The decision t

    4: 6. The Dictatorial Power of Putin and the Unification of Ukraine Post-2014. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the unilateral nature of decision-making in the Kremlin regarding the 2014 invasion. The decision t
    Oct 20 2025
    6. The Dictatorial Power of Putin and the Unification of Ukraine Post-2014. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) focuses on the unilateral nature of decision-making in the Kremlin regarding the 2014 invasion. The decision to annex Crimea and fragment Ukraine was made by Vladimir Putin and his security chiefs during an all-night meeting on February 23–24, 2014. This process confirmed that Russia operates as a dictatorship, transitioning from the hope of Russian democracy under Yeltsin to the current reality where Putin's power is rooted in the super-presidential constitution established in 1993. Putin initially gained public support through brutality in Chechnya. While Ukraine was traditionally viewed as split between Eastern and Western orientations, Russia actively exploited these linguistic, cultural, and religious divisions in 2014 to justify the takeover of Crimea and the initiation of hybrid warfare in Donbas. Crucially, the professor emphasizes that the shock of the 2014 conflict had the opposite effect desired by Moscow: it unified Ukrainian society far more than it had ever been before. Moscow's biggest error in planning the 2022 invasion was proceeding under the assumption that Ukraine was still the divided country it had been in 2014.
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    8 m
  • 4: 5. Western Appeasement of 2014: Crimea Annexation and the Flawed Minsk Accords. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) examines the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, following the appearance of "l

    4: 5. Western Appeasement of 2014: Crimea Annexation and the Flawed Minsk Accords. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) examines the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, following the appearance of "l
    Oct 20 2025
    5. Western Appeasement of 2014: Crimea Annexation and the Flawed Minsk Accords. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) examines the Western reaction to the annexation of Crimea in February 2014, following the appearance of "little green men." Professor Plokhy asserts that had the West reacted to the Crimean annexation with the same severity as they did to the 2022 invasion, the major war might have been avoided. Instead, the collective West treated Crimea as an isolated exception, drawing a historical parallel to the 1930s Anschluss of Austria, and mistakenly believed that Putin would stop there. This flawed assumption led Germany to pursue economic ties like Nord Stream 2, hoping escalation would be less likely. Moreover, NATO's policy was to pacify Russia by not placing military units close to its borders, leaving the alliance with "very little to respond with" in 2014. Although the annexation was quickly followed by Russian-concocted violence in Donbas, leading to a massive Russian counterattack in summer 2014, the West pursued the Minsk II agreements. These agreements were often implemented according to Russia's interpretation: requiring elections first under Russian military control, intended to create a "Trojan horse" to destabilize Ukraine and preclude its movement toward the EU or NATO. This approach was closely related to the "policies of appeasement of the 1930s."
    1840 KHIV
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    10 m
  • 4: 4. The 2014 Kremlin Decision and Ukrainian Unity Against Russian Imperialism. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses the all-night Kremlin meeting on February 23–24, 2014, where Vladimir Putin and his state security

    4: 4. The 2014 Kremlin Decision and Ukrainian Unity Against Russian Imperialism. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses the all-night Kremlin meeting on February 23–24, 2014, where Vladimir Putin and his state security
    Oct 20 2025
    4. The 2014 Kremlin Decision and Ukrainian Unity Against Russian Imperialism. Serhii Plokhy (Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University) discusses the all-night Kremlin meeting on February 23–24, 2014, where Vladimir Putin and his state security chiefs unilaterally decided to annex Crimea and fragment Ukraine. This scene exemplifies modern Russia's nature as a dictatorship, where critical decisions are made by one man—Putin, a former FSB chekist—without democratic oversight. Putin's dictatorial powers are legally based on the super-presidential constitution approved in 1993, following Boris Yeltsin's actions against the parliament. Previously, Putin built credibility by being brutal during the conquest of Chechnya in 1999. A longstanding stereotype divided Ukraine between westward (often Roman Catholic/cosmopolitan) and eastward (Orthodox/Russian-speaking) orientations. While Russia exploited these existing linguistic, cultural, and religious tensions in 2014 to facilitate the seizure of Crimea and initiate hybrid warfare in Donbas, the ultimate effect of the 2014 aggression was the creation of a much more unified Ukrainian society than had ever existed before. Moscow's failure to recognize this post-2014 change was a fundamental miscalculation when invading in 2022.
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    9 m