What are hallucinations, depressive episodes, or panic attacks?

We know what they are, of course - psychiatric symptoms. The problem is that we don’t know what they are - ontologically.

Which is to say: are they the manifestations of a compromised neurobiological mechanism? Or perhaps phenomena carrying a meaning to be deciphered? Adaptive strategies, defense mechanisms?

The ninth episode is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of psychiatric symptoms and the power of the conceptual lenses we wear to understand them.

References

Eagle, M. N. (2011). From classical to contemporary psychoanalysis: A critique and integration. Routledge.

Ritunnano, R., Humpston, C., & Broome, M. R. (2022). Finding order within the disorder: A case study exploring the meaningfulness of delusions. BJPsych Bulletin, 46(2), 109–115. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjb.2020.151

Russell, J. (2024). How delusions can uncover sources of harm and pathology: The epistemic value of interoceptive & unconscious information. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 5. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.11490

Every other Monday, at 12pm.

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This project exists in Italian as well: In Front of the Mirror - Il podcast in Italiano

The question of all questions: What do we mean when we say that therapy brings about change?

Then, if there are different types of therapy, are there also different kinds of change?

And furthermore, when it comes to the person - "who" is changing? And, where should we start if we want to build the sense a person has of being themselves?

References:

Kellog S., Torres A. (2021) Chairwork invites you to shift perspective on who you are. Aeon

Kiverstein J, Rietveld E, Denys D. (2021) World Wide Open. Aeon

Rossi Monti M. (2016) Manuale di psichiatria per psicologi. Carocci Editore.

Rosfort, R., & Stanghellini, G. (2015). The Patient as an Autonomous Person: Hermeneutical Phenomenology as a Resource for an Ethics for Psychiatrists . In J. Z. Sadler, W. van Staden, & KWM. Fulford (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics (Vol. 1, pp. 319-335). Oxford https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198732365.013.26

Every other Monday, at 12pm.

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This project exists in Italian as well: ⁠⁠In Front of the Mirror - Il Podcast in Italiano⁠

When do we become who we are? What makes me the person I am, and not someone else?

How far back should we go, to find that out?

And what does it mean to embrace our destiny, to own our story?

Today we are thrilled to discuss these topics with Susi Ferrarello, philosopher, Professor at California State University, East Bay, and philosophical counsellor.

Susi's book: Ferrarello, S. (2024). The Phenomenology of Pregnancy and Early Motherhood: Ethical, Social, and Psychological Perspectives (1st ed.). Routledge.Other references:

Ammaniti, M., & Gallese, V. (2014). The birth of intersubjectivity: Psychodynamics, neurobiology, and the self. W. W. Norton & Company.Beebe, B., & Steele, M. (2013). How does microanalysis of mother–infant communication inform maternal sensitivity and infant attachment? Attachment & Human Development, 15(5–6), 583–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616734.2013.841050

Hillman, J. (1996)The Soul’s Code: In Search of Character and Calling.

It has even been said that depression, anorexia, and phobia are not something we ‘have’, rather they are modes of being of the person. But what does ‘being’ depressed, anorexic, or phobic mean?

It has even been said these pathologies do not happen to the person, they are worlds instead, which persons inhabit. So: one does not have autism, one is autistic. Or, at least, this is what they say.

It has even been said that one has become schizophrenic, as if it were the culmination of a personal, and unique trajectory. But, which formulations can make justice to the lived experience of the person?

In this episode Cristiano will be the spokesperson of the “being” formulation. But Giacomo has got some objections.

So: does one have a mental illness, or should we rather say that one is mentally ill? If the titles didn’t make it clear enough, this debate is our focus for this, and the last episode.

References

Bollas, C. (2015). When the sun bursts: the enigma of schizophrenia. Yale University Press.

Carrère. E. (2011) Lives Other Than My Own: A Memoir

Laing, R. D. (1960) The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Penguin Books

Lingiardi, V., & McWilliams, N. (Eds.). (2017). Psychodynamic diagnostic manual: PDM-2 (2nd ed.). The Guilford Press.

Stanghellini, G., Broome, M. R., Fernandez, A. V., Fusar-Poli, P., Raballo, A., & Rosfort, R. (Eds.). (2019). Oxford handbook of phenomenological psychopathology. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803157.001.0001

A video adaptation produced by the World Health Organization (2012), based on Matthew Johnstone’s book (2005). I had a black dog, his name was depression

Every other Monday, at 12pm.

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This project exists in Italian as well: ⁠In Front of the Mirror - Il Podcast in Italiano⁠

One says that depression, anorexia and phobia is something we ‘have’, and ‘suffer from’. But what does ‘having’ a psychiatric condition mean?

One says these pathologies happen to the person, and are foreign to them. So: one is not autistic, one has autism. Or, at least, this is what they say.

One says that this formulation is first and foremost a moral conquest. In assuming so, we stop blaming the person. But can this really alleviate the stigma?

In this episode Giacomo will be the spokesperson of the “having” formulation. But Cristiano has got some objections.

So: does one have a mental illness, or should we rather say that one is mentally ill? If the title didn’t make it clear enough, this debate will be our focus for this, and the next episode.

References:

Laing, R. D. (1960) The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Penguin Books

Sass, L. A. (2007). `Schizophrenic Person’ or `Person with Schizophrenia’? An Essay on Illness and the Self. Theory & Psychology, 17(3), 395-420. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354307073152

Sapolsky’s video on the neurobiology of depression:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOAgplgTxfc

14 years later, Sapolsky has updated his lecture.Link to the new version:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzUXcBTQXKM

Every other Monday, at 12pm.

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This project exists in Italian as well: ⁠In Front of the Mirror - Il Podcast in Italiano⁠

"Is this pathology neurological or psychiatric?". Physicians often wonder about it. How can they identify and distinguish between these two categories?

What if the two are entangled, as the case of organic pathologies with psychiatric symptoms shows?

And since when are shoes part of psychiatric semeiotics?

Today we are pleased to discuss these topics with David Tèstérini, physician and neurologist.

About the guest:

David Tèstérini holds a degree in medicine with a specialization in functional neurology, along with academic training in bioethics, philosophy, and epistemology. His studies at prestigious institutions across the USA, UK, Germany, and Italy demonstrate a diverse and globally informed perspective. His research critically examines the epistemological underpinnings of medical practice, investigating how knowledge in neuroscience and medicine is constructed, interpreted, and applied. Drawing on insights from neuroscience, phenomenology, and enactivism, he has also explored the complex interplay between consciousness, perception, cognition, motor function, and embodied experience, with a particular emphasis on the relationships among pain, movement, and cognitive processes. Grounded in postmodern epistemology, his work seeks to establish a transdisciplinary paradigm that integrates the connections between the brain, body, and lived experience. This approach ultimately aims to redefine how suffering is understood and engaged with across diverse fields of knowledge and practice.

References:

Dew, R. (2009) Why psychiatry is the hardest specialty. American Journal of Psychiatry.

Milone, P. (2023) The Art of Binding People.

Rossi Monti, M. (2024) Manuale di psichiatria per psicologi. Carocci Editore.

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Every other Monday, at 12pm.

Follow us on:

⁠⁠⁠Instagram: @mirror_podcast_⁠⁠⁠

⁠⁠⁠Twitter/𝕏: @mirror_podcast⁠⁠

This project exists in Italian as well: ⁠⁠In Front of the Mirror - Il Podcast in Italiano⁠⁠

What makes a pattern of behavior, thinking and feeling a disorder, a pathology?

Is it the presence of a dysfunction, suffering, a conflict with societal norms?

Can these criteria truly demarcate what is defined as pathological from what is not?

In this episode, Cristiano will scrutinize these very criteria, questioning them.

This episode continues the analysis that Giacomo began in the previous one, between normality and normativity.

References:

Bortolotti, L. (2023). Why Delusions Matter. Bloomsbury PublishingButler, PV (2000)

Reverse Othello syndrome subsequent to traumatic brain injury. Psychiatry. doi: 10.1080/00332747.2000.11024897.

May, J. (2023). Neuroethics: Agency in the Age of Brain Science. New York, US: Oxford University Press.

McKay R, Langdon R, Coltheart M. (2005) "Sleights of mind": delusions, defences, and self-deception. Cogn Neuropsychiatry. doi: 10.1080/13546800444000074.

Münch R, Walter H and Müller S (2020) Should Behavior Harmful to Others Be a Sufficient Criterion of Mental Disorders? Conceptual Problems of the Diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Pedophilic Disorder. Front. Psychiatry. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.558655

Nesse RM, Stein DJ. (2012) Towards a genuinely medical model for psychiatric nosology. BMC Med. doi: 10.1186/1741-7015-10-5.

Stanghellini, G. (2018). Metaphors of pathology. International Review of Psychiatry, 30(2), 140–152. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261.2018.1444011

The British Psychological Society. (2014). Understanding Psychosis and Schizophrenia.

Institute for the Study of the Neurologically Typical: https://erikengdahl.se/autism/isnt/

Downside Up | A short film by Peter Ghesquiere: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNxO-wv3S9o

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Every other Monday, at 12pm.

Follow us on:

⁠⁠Instagram: @mirror_podcast_⁠⁠

⁠⁠Twitter/𝕏: @mirror_podcast⁠

This project exists in Italian as well: ⁠In Front of the Mirror - Il Podcast in Italiano⁠

When one claims that something or someone is normal, what do they mean?

And when one claims that is not, normal?

Could investigating what a norm is, or what a rule is, ever help us make sense of all of it?

In this episode, Giacomo embarks on a journey through the concepts that underlie and support our idea of normality. In the next episode, Cristiano will continue by talking about boundaries.

References:

Carrère E. (1993). I am alive and you are dead. A journey into the mind of Philip K. Dick. Picador.

Copp D. (2022). Normativity in Metaetichs. Stanford Encyclopidia of Philosophy.

Vogt H. Hoffman B. Getz L. (2016). Personalized medicine: evidence of normativity in its quantitative definition of health. Springer.

Wegwood R. (2018). The Unity of Normativity. The Oxford Handbookk of Reasons and Normativity.

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Every other Monday, at 12pm.

Follow us on:

⁠Instagram: @mirror_podcast_⁠

⁠Twitter/𝕏: @mirror_podcast

This project exists in Italian as well: In Front of the Mirror - Il Podcast in Italiano