Course 17 - Computer Network Security Protocols And Techniques | Episode 6: The Evolution of End Point Authentication: Securing Identities
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Narrado por:
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De:
- What end point authentication is and why it matters
- Why early authentication methods failed
- How replay attacks and spoofing work
- The role of nonces in proving “liveness”
- Why public keys alone are not enough
- How digital certificates solve Man-in-the-Middle attacks
- An entity simply claims an identity, or
- Identity is inferred from the source IP address
- Problem: Attackers can easily spoof IP addresses
- Result: No real proof of identity
- Users authenticate by sending a password (plain or encrypted)
- Problem: Vulnerable to replay attacks
- An attacker records the authentication packet
- The same packet is resent later to gain access
- Encryption does not prevent replay
- A random number used only once
- Ensures the communicating party is “live”
- Bob sends a nonce to Alice
- Alice encrypts the nonce using a shared secret key
- Bob decrypts and verifies the response
- Prevents replay attacks
- Proves the entity is actively responding
- Requires a pre-shared secret key
- Not scalable for large networks or the internet
- Removes the need for pre-shared secrets
- Anyone can encrypt data using a public key
- An attacker intercepts the communication
- Substitutes their own public key
- Alice and Bob each think they are talking directly
- Attacker reads and modifies all traffic
- Public key cryptography alone does not authenticate identity
- Bind a public key to a verified identity
- Prevent attackers from substituting keys unnoticed
- Verify identities
- Issue digital certificates
- Sign certificates using their private key
- An attacker cannot forge a valid certificate
- Any key substitution attempt is detected
- Trust is anchored in the CA
- This model is the foundation of HTTPS
- Modern browsers automatically verify certificates
- End point authentication is now built into everyday internet use
- Identity claims and IP-based authentication are insecure
- Passwords alone are vulnerable to replay attacks
- Nonces add freshness but require shared secrets
- Public keys enable scalability but are MITM-prone
- Digital certificates are the only robust solution
- Trusted third parties are essential for secure authentication
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