The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor

Separating Fact from Fiction about the "Unprovoked and Dastardly Attack"

The story that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked, surprise attack is perhaps the biggest and most fiercely defended myth in American history. Yet, with each passing year, the evidence continues to grow that the attack was not a surprise to certain high officials in the government and was not unprovoked.

This book, written by an author with 21 years of experience in military signals intelligence, presents evidence that President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and other senior officials knew that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. It discusses key evidence such as the Hoover-Ladd memos, the bomb plot messages, direction-finding bearings from signals from the Japanese task force, a Navy document on the pre-attack interception of the "East Wind Rain" execute message, revealing research done by members of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, General George C. Marshall's incriminating actions on the morning of the attack, the suspicious departure of FDR's favorite Navy ship from Pearl Harbor less than 48 hours before the attack, FDR's strange decision to base the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, FDR's secret Red Cross order, disclosures from former government officials and agents, and credible and mutually corroborating accounts from former foreign intelligence operatives and officials--and much more.

This book also examines FDR's refusal to reach a reasonable peace agreement with Japan, his determination to provoke Japan into “firing the first shot,” and his intervention in China to prevent the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists from making a peace deal. Preventing peace in China and provoking war between America and Japan were two major policy goals of the Soviet Union, and FDR's disastrous pro-Soviet foreign policy played a decisive role in making those goals become tragic reality.

In addition, the book answers many of the arguments put forward by defenders of the traditional story, such as those made by Philip Jacobsen, Henry Clausen, David Kahn, Stephen Budiansky, and Robert Hanyok.

And, in the final chapter and in a lengthy appendix, this book takes a critical look at FDR's handling of World War II, the Allied war crimes tribunals held in Asia after the war, the traditional claims about Japan's actions in Manchuria and China, the fire-bombing of Japan, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Poorly written and poorly read

The approach of the book is confrontational from the beginning, rather than presenting facts and letting the listener decide, which makes it seem amateurish. The AI narration is uncommonly poor; for example, it seems like if there is a picture on the page in the written version, the AI narration reads the caption when it gets to it, which is confusing. Pronunciation for the abbreviations is also poor, like Office of Naval Intelligence would normally be pronounced O N I, but in the book it is pronounced ohknee. I had to hear it several times before I realized what the narration was trying to say.