
Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
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Compra ahora por $19.95
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Narrado por:
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Jim R. Sartor
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De:
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Barry R. Posen
The United States, Barry R. Posen argues in Restraint, has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that he calls "liberal hegemony", one that Posen sees as unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful. Written for policymakers and observers alike, Restraint explains precisely why this grand strategy works poorly and then provides a carefully designed alternative grand strategy and an associated military strategy and force structure. In contrast to the failures and unexpected problems that have stemmed from America's consistent overreaching, Posen makes an urgent argument for restraint in the future use of US military strength.
After setting out the political implications of restraint as a guiding principle, Posen sketches the appropriate military forces and posture that would support such a strategy. He works with a deliberately constrained notion of grand strategy and, even more important, of national security (which he defines as including sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position, and safety). His alternative for military strategy, which Posen calls "command of the commons", focuses on protecting US global access through naval, air, and space power, while freeing the United States from most of the relationships that require the permanent stationing of US forces overseas.
The book is published by Cornell University Press.
©2014 Cornell University (P)2017 Redwood AudiobooksListeners also enjoyed...




















Reseñas de la Crítica
Second: the author has a tendency towards assertions without examples (let alone evidence), largely ignores the changes in warfare where they don’t support his thesis, has a simplistic view of submarine and air operations, and seems to be fond of looking at the parts rather than the whole. I was expecting more.
Problematic, frustrating, but of some use
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