Lunch with President Wilson
How Woodrow Wilson failed to end the First World War in 1916.
No se pudo agregar al carrito
Solo puedes tener X títulos en el carrito para realizar el pago.
Add to Cart failed.
Por favor prueba de nuevo más tarde
Error al Agregar a Lista de Deseos.
Por favor prueba de nuevo más tarde
Error al eliminar de la lista de deseos.
Por favor prueba de nuevo más tarde
Error al añadir a tu biblioteca
Por favor intenta de nuevo
Error al seguir el podcast
Intenta nuevamente
Error al dejar de seguir el podcast
Intenta nuevamente
$0.00 por los primeros 30 días
Escucha audiolibros, podcasts y Audible Originals con Audible Plus por un precio mensual bajo.
Escucha en cualquier momento y en cualquier lugar en tus dispositivos con la aplicación gratuita Audible.
Los suscriptores por primera vez de Audible Plus obtienen su primer mes gratis. Cancela la suscripción en cualquier momento.
Compra ahora por $4.99
-
Narrado por:
-
Virtual Voice
-
De:
-
Michael Bennett
Este título utiliza narración de voz virtual
Voz Virtual es una narración generada por computadora para audiolibros..
With Germany’s eastern border secure, Germany’s Reich Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg recognized that the organized slaughter of trench warfare with Britain and France, on the Western Front, had become a strategic irrelevance who's continuation risked the blockade being imposed by the Royal Navy slowly wearing down Germany's ability to fight to the point where Berlin might be forced to sue for peace. Bethmann saw another, bleaker scenario; the inevitable defeat he believed would follow an American military intervention, provoked by the return to unrestricted submarine warfare being demanded by Germany's military leadership.
Recognising that only a negotiated peace would secure Germany’s place in Europe, during the summer of 1916, Bethmann persuaded Kaiser Wilhelm II to agree to a request to President Wilson to issue a call for mediation. The military leadership's support was conditional; unless it was in place by the 1st of February 1917, they demanded a return to unrestricted submarine warfare, abandoned in 1915 after the sinking of the Lusitania had brought the United States to the edge of a declaration of war.
On the 1st of September 1916, the German Ambassador in Washington, Count Johann von Bernstorff, delivered an extraordinary message to President Wilson's advisor, Edward House: Germany wanted to end the war and requested that the President issue a call for mediation.
There is nothing in Wilson’s two presidential terms that approaches the significance of the period between the delivery of Berlin's request for mediation, on the 1st of September 1916 and the decision to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, taken on the 1st of February 1917. Between those dates the opportunity for a negotiated settlement was allowed to slip away and the United States‘ intervention in a war that Wilson had been determined to avoid became almost inevitable. Time and again the narrative leads away from consideration of the political reality facing those in Berlin, London and Washington, who sought a negotiated settlement and back to Wilson, his personality and dysfunctional relationship with House. This is the story of those five crucial month, at the heart of which lies a failure of character rather than intellect, told through two fictional interviews with Wilson, set in 1922.
Todavía no hay opiniones