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Frank P. Mintz

Remember Percy L. Greaves, the Maestro of the Pearl Harbor Investigations

Reviewed in the United States on April 10, 2015

Verified Purchase

This is a thorough, meticulous review of the events that led to the War in the Pacific. It can be criticized for utilizing primarily older sources
and for a lack of graceful style. Perhaps then it would merit a "5-star." However, there was a wealth of information in earlier government publications and in the records, not just testimonies, provided in the numerous 1940s investigations of the road to Pearl Harbor and responsibilities
for what could be called the great tactical (not strategic) success of the December 7th attack. These investigations included several by the
armed forces and, ultimately, the congressional inquest of 1945-1946. The plain-spoken and repetitious approach taken by Greaves (and
maintained by his widow) is just what is needed to keep the issues very clear and to see the plain evasions in other studies. Greaves was a keen student of the investigative and official transcripts, and obtained crucial interviews with Laurance Safford, the Navy cryptologist, who stuck by his recollections of the receipt of the "East Wind Rain Message." Recommended for patient readers of all ages who want to get an invaluable reference work integrating the diplomatic and crypto-analytic developments on the road to Pearl Harbor.

Douglas Terry

Good History, a lot of detail and repetition

Reviewed in the United States on January 29, 2015

Verified Purchase

This book takes on the subject of how much the administration knew about the likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. It almost certainly goes in with some bias against the Roosevelt administration. I have studied history over many years and have the same bias. To me Roosevelt and his administration absolutely lied to the American public saying he would keep America out of the war while making plans to help the British and Dutch win over Germany and Japan. Roosevelt did want the Japanese to "hit us first but not hurt us." To me there is not question that the administration expected the Japanese to attack the USA though they did not necessarily expect an attack on Hawaii. Once it did happen the administration and top military leadership needed scapegoats to take blame away from themselves. Those scapegoats were General Short and Admiral Kimmel. The book goes into a great bit of detail exploring what eh top leadership know and did and what was passed on to the commanders in the field. The book covers the many investigations of the disaster at Pearl Harbor in great detail. As a result it can become tedious at times and certainly repetitious. This is not a light read. It's for the student of history. It's the sort of book I read a chapter, break and read something else and come back to it later.

CuriousOne

Shocking to see a US leader no different from Stalin and Hitler.

Reviewed in the United States on September 6, 2015

Verified Purchase

Thanks for truth seekers and the freedom of information act which provided insight into the evils of FDR. He sacrificed the US navy men at Pearl Harbor just to convince Americans to join the European war. How evil and how opposite what government schools teach.

Thomas K. Kimmel Jr.

The Last Pearl Harbor Story Principal

Reviewed in the United States on September 14, 2010

Verified Purchase

Percy and Bettina Greaves [Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy, Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama, 2010, 937 pages] never mention, but more than justify Vice President Joe Biden's pre-election comment that, "[The Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short matter] is the most tragic injustice in American military history." And they do so without ever using the word, conspiracy. Just the facts--mainly those uttered under oath by the principals involved, many who are thus injured by the testimony that they intended to use to injure others: Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark most notably. The fact that the Department of Defense remains almost willfully obtuse to these facts continues to disappoint; indeed, amaze.

In 2000, the Congress, led by then Senator Joe Biden, passed a law recommending that the President posthumously advance Kimmel and Short to their highest held temporary ranks in World War II in accordance with the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 from which they alone have been punitively excluded. Percy Greaves deceased in 1984, the same year that the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association (PHSA) initiated the preceding action. Clearly, PHSA would have referenced this book in its decades long struggle had it been available to them. Before the sun finally sets on PHSA the matter should be revisited using this book as exhibit A+: a well-deserved A+.

The Seeds: A chronological trace of the conflicting forces from 1894 that led the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941. The chronology depicts a well-informed President secretly making, but not declaring war; or an innocently-surprised President honorably standing on principle. The reader is prompted to decide.
The Seeds alone is worth the price of the book, but the payoff is The Fruits.

The Fruits: Another chronology, but this time by a Pearl-Harbor story principal, Percy Greaves, who served as the minority counsel for the Joint Congressional Committee (JCC) investigating the attack. This makes the book perhaps the last first-hand account of the Pearl-Harbor story we will ever get, which by itself automatically makes the book unique, and important.

Greaves is at his best describing what he knows best, his work for JCC member Senator Homer Ferguson. Greaves suggested the lead that led to the highlight of the entire JCC proceeding--the testimony of Navy Commander Lester R. Schultz, who on December 6th delivered the 13th part of the 14-part Japanese response to the American Note of November 26, 1941, prompting the President to famously say, "This means war." This in turn prompted investigators to wonder if the President could possibly read this secret communication from the enemy, declare that, "this means war," and not immediately reach out for the heads of his army and navy. Thus begins the sycophantic stories of Marshall's mendacity and Stark's shame presented in their own disgraceful words chronologically.

Greaves presents news to this life-long student of the attack. Commander Joe Rochefort, the cyptographic hero of the June 4-7, 1941, Battle of Midway, inexplicably was also a casualty of the post-Pearl Harbor attack personnel changes and ordered in October 1942 to command a floating drydock in San Francisco. Enroute he serendipitously met Kimmel in New York and gave Kimmel his first hint that crucial information about Japanese intentions had been available in Washington prior to the attack, which had not been relayed to him in Pearl Harbor. This then may well have been the genesis of Kimmel's long march toward vindication, and helped explain why the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in Washington, D.C., which Kimmel was forced to rely on prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, was ignored by Kimmel's successor, Admiral Nimitz, after the attack. Indeed, ONI was not even aware of the Battle of Midway until it was over. Rochefort's belated vindication came posthumously in 1985 when awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Bettina Greaves demonstrates enormous discipline by offering almost nothing that was learned after her husband deceased in 1984. This adds much to the credibility of the work, which, of course, is attributed to him. Nonetheless, Mrs. Greaves must have been sorely tempted to include a host of relevant information made public since 1984--a couple of examples should suffice for the point:

1. President Reagan's Director of Central Intelligence William Casey wrote in 1988 that, "The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." (William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler, 1988, p.7);

2. MI6's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Chairman Victor Cavendish-Bentinck reportedly said that, "We knew that [the Japanese Fleet] had changed course [by Friday, December 5, 1941]. I remember presiding over a JIC meeting and being told that a Japanese Fleet was sailing in the direction of Hawaii, asking `Have we informed our transatlantic brethren?' and receiving an affirmative reply." (Richard Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Cambridge Press, 2000, p.87);

3. Sir Julian Ridsdale, member of the JIC, "Recalled a JIC meeting at which radio silence adopted by the Japanese fleet was discussed and its possible destinations reviewed. Pearl Harbor was one of the targets thought most likely and as a result a warning telegram was despatched to Washington. [He later] met with Cavendish-Bentinck and confirmed that a warning telegram had been despatched." (Richard Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan, Cambridge Press, 2000, p.87);

4. Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) Member USA General Henry Russell's APHB reminiscences. (Henry Russell, Pearl Harbor Story, 2001 {written 1946});

5. Admiral Arthur McCollum's October 7, 1940 "Action Proposal" to D/ONI revealed in 1999 by Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit.; and

6. VENONA declassification in 1995 by NSA confirming that Harry Dexter White and Launchlin Currie were Soviet spies.

Percy Greaves once wrote that there was no need to go beyond the known facts in telling the Pearl Harbor story. He was correct, and this book is testament to a noble effort to get the facts straight as he knew them.
Regards,
Tom Kimmel

Tom Kimmel is a former naval officer, a retired FBI agent, and a grandson of Admiral Kimmel. For more information his website is: [...]

David

Pearl Harbor attack

Reviewed in the United States on April 27, 2013

Verified Purchase

Men;

This is a great book on the Pearl Harbor attack and inquiry. The battle could have been avoided by betetr diplomatic work, but, Secrtetary Hull didn't follow Ambassador Grew's ideas. Also, FDR should have gone to Tokyo in September instead of waiting until it was too late. By going to Tokyo FDR would have possibly avoided the Pearl Harboor attack, America would have been better prepared for war which would have come anyway, though later.
David Karickhoff

Les Smith

Perhaps too much information. I start to read it ...

Reviewed in the United States on December 14, 2015

Verified Purchase

Perhaps too much information. I start to read it, and have to take a break to clear my mind of all the detail

G. I. . Rhodus

A sad day remembered!

Reviewed in the United States on September 26, 2014

Verified Purchase

Fair document in view of the data available!