The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today

I could have listened to this in one sitting. You watch on TV the wars the US has going on and don't know what to make of all the problems they have concluding them. Was it inevitable? Is it incompetence? This book insightfully connects all the dots since WWII and talks about individual generals and and how they can excel or screw up based on who is running the army. A major point he makes is that in WWII commanders were replaced quickly if deemed incompetent. Nowadays no one is fired. Another point is commanders are taught to think tactically but not strategically. I'll probably reread this one.

Haven't read the book. Just listened.

The whole book is memorable and sadly points out what else has gone to hell with the USA since WW2.

???

It's not meant to be filmed. Should be read and discussed.

A must read to explain the current failure of the once great American military that in the 40s destroyed Hitler and Tojo's minions in about 5 years compared to the sorry incompetents who lead America's military today. The book correctly points out that the fault is NOT with the enlisted serviceman we all rightly honor and respect [well most of them] but the sorry excuses for generals leading them since the Korean War. Reward failure and you get what we have now, ten years of incompetence and an Afghanistan that is in worse shape than it was six months after 9/11 when at least the Taliban was momentarily beaten. The book should be read by every American who gives a damn about the USA. Next book by this author should be "The teachers" another sad story of incompetence thanks this time mostly to the teacher's union. Incompetent teachers are even harder to fire than incompetent generals. The administrators of our failed education system should be fired en masse.

I served 20 years in the military before I retired. I served in Vietnam and worked in joint commands so am quite familiar with the Army, Navy and Marines. I would like to think this makes my comments of more value than someone less familiar with the military.

The author started with a great thesis- namely the decline of the Army Leadership by the Generals who have led the US both during and since World War II. He then did an excellent job supporting his position by offering great insight into all of the wars in which the army has been deployed- from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan. Portraits of all of the American Generals who commanded the US Army in these- Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, McArthur, Ridgeway, Taylor, Westmoreland, Abrams, Schwartzkopf, Powell, Franks, Petraeus, Sanchez, McCrystal are laid out here for the listener, as well as how each contribted to the success or failure of the army high command during these wars.

George Catlett Marshall- whom quite frankly not many people know enough about and appreciate today. Ricks portrays him as the father of what was great in the army during World War II- namely the ability to select men of high intelligence, energy and affability to lead the US forces- and to remove from command those generals who did not win battles. I became so fascinated by Ricks' portrait of Marshall that after listening to this recording I actually purchased and am reading a biography of Marshall from Amazon (Ed Cray's book entitled "General Of The Army"- which happens to be a great read so far) . Not many people actually realize it but Marshall wanted to command the Allied Invasion at Normandy in 1944- and it was at Franklin Roosevelt's request that he did not agree to become the commander and instead appointed Eisenhower- who as we all know won enough accolade and fame to eventually be elected President of the US.

All were decently portrayed

While I did not have an extreme reaction to the book, I must admit that I came away with the feeling that the current US Army command leadership structure needs to be reformed and new blood infused into that institution if the army is to be a relevant force in protecting the interests of our country. I believe that the author's recommendations on how to bring about and implement this change are well laid out in the epilogue to the book

I am glad that I purchased and listened to the book. While another reviewer has aptly pointed out that there is only theme to this book and that the author constantly reiterates it- I believe that book is well written and well narrated and worth the listen.

For research yes.

Very much so.

None, a non-fiction book.

Not really

I thought Tom Rick's conclusions were over simplistic. The military's promotion system is very rigid and assignments aren't always well thought out. Yet, almost all Generals I have seen or met were extremely bright and gifted people. However, the basis of his conclusions are correct. Generals are a product that shined in the system they were raise in. There are many inefficiencies in that system. Generals (and higher grade officers and enlisted) are not held into account nearly as much as they used to be. The current system of rotating Generals and the COs below result in much turnover, overlap, rework (reinventing the wheel). Perhaps its not that I disagree with his conclusion on modern Generalship, it's rather he should extend those conclusions to the modern promotion and assignment system as a whole... Another book?

In "The Generals," Thomas Ricks relates a history of generalship (and officership) in the U.S. Army (WWII to present), but also provides his interpretation on how future officers and generals should act with regards to civil-military relationships and how the Army institution should conduct officer development. Whether a commissioned officer agrees with the opinions stated in this book, the history lessons on officer development alone are worth reading/listening too. The book strongly favors the history and concerns of the U.S. Army with barely a mention of the other four Armed Forces. Perhaps follow-up volumes regarding the other services are needed to fully address officer development in the United States military.

The role of Generals as mentors is shown to be critical, showing both stellar and disastrous results.

Mr Rick's work sheds some light on some weight issues. There are various aspects of this book which should really be studied more closely. The first part of the book covering WW2 is quite interesting but it seems like he is very brief with the command problems of the corps and above echelons. He does cover division level problems well though. The most interesting part of the book is at the end where he covers the generals of today and I wish this part were twice as long so he could go into greater details, especially covering the later stages of Afghanistan.

Yes. There is a great deal of condensed military history that is easy to forget but deserving remembering.

An inside look at a culture most of us never consider even existing: The US military.

There are no scenes.Once the author passes World War 2 he reveals a lot of history and politics that are rarely thought of or discussed.

Not applicable.

Concise, prepared and backed with as much evidence as you are likely to find. The author seriously critiques the strengths and weaknesses of military culture while taking us along its development for the last 60 years. He supplements solid fact with anecdote and information that we know about human sociology in general to form a compelling tapestry explaining political and military struggles from the 60's onward.

The Generals does a good job of summing key army generals of the past 75 years. Thee sections pre Gulf War seem well researched. Where I begin to question the book is during the 1991 Gulf War and after. The sources used are a bit too close to the issues under discussion to be objective. Add to that the idea of armchair generalship when people like Spyder Marks and Barry Mcafree are quoted who seem to revel in critiquing wars on major networks; this section must be taken a large grain of salt. That being said the book seems to be a good starting point for further investigation

The Author pushes the idea of command relief throughout the book. While, a worthy idea it is unrealistic to expect it to be put in place any time soon. The evidence presented does cry out for greater accountability among the general staff.

The Narration is perfectly ordinary but I recommend taking the book in small sections, otherwise one person quickly bleeds into the next

It's sometimes hard to say what makes a good non-fiction audiobook, but in my view, this book has that je ne sais quais. I found myself coming back to it, and putting aside other tasks I needed to get done so I could sit and listen to a book. It's a fascinating story that's pretty well summarized in the publisher's summary: in World War II, generals were relieved easily when it was felt this would aid the mission, and this was not a career ending event if the general had not screwed up egregiously. Today, generals are very rarely removed, and when they are, it's such an aberration that their careers are basically over. In today's military, failure is not punished, and as a corollary, success is not rewarded.

A high point of the book is the telling of the personnel story of the World War II army, an incredibly important story that I knew almost nothing about. George Marshall turns out to be one of the most influential Americans of the 20th century whose name you know, but not much else about him. He had tremendous influence over the military's leadership culture in ways large and small, and since most American men of that generation served in the military, he had great influence over how America was run for decades thereafter. The relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower is an interesting one that I knew little about. The figure who really comes off poorly here is Douglas MacArthur. Apparently the American Caeser was something of a buffoon, who unfortunately was a little too powerful for Marshall to dismiss the way he did most of the bungling pre-WWII military leadership.

How and why Marshall's recipe for military leadership ended up being discarded is the meat of the book, but a question that's never quite answered succinctly. Was Marshall's tragic flaw relying too much on his own moderating leadership at the top? Or did he engender too much respect for team players, a good short-run policy for winning a war but a bad long-term policy for maintaining an innovative culture. Ricks doesn't give us one simple answer. Another high point of the book though is Ricks' telling of the Vietnam story, and especially the difference between the army and the marines' outlook on counter-insurgency strategy (spoiler: the marines got it right, but the army was the far larger force).

It's not the most original part of the book, but Ricks makes a very forceful case that the post-Vietnam reforms were ultimately destructive to military competence, as the military focused purely on technical competency, afraid to tackle deeper questions of strategy and doctrine. It's a pretty damning indictment, and I'd be curious to hear a response from military leadership. One of Ricks' sharpest critiques is that the military hides its own failures by blaming civilian leaders, and declaring parts of its core responsibilities to be someone else's job. So the failure in Vietnam was one of civilians not letting the military win, and the Iraq War debacle was all the Bush administration's refusal to commit enough troops. During World War II, Ricks points out, George Marshall told the president what he needed to win, and if he hadn't gotten it, he was ready to resign. If civilian leaders have bungled our recent wars, including Desert Storm by failing to have any sort of plan for the endgame, they were aided and abetted by military leaders who saw their job as being entirely technical in nature, with overarching strategy questions always left to someone else.

If I would fault the book on anything it's that the thesis is actually pretty straightforward, and while the detail and case studies in the book are interesting, I'm not sure they're necessary to make Ricks' point. The argument might have more influence in a shorter magazine article, say. But I don't regret listening to the whole story in the least. I'd very much like to see Ricks take his insights to other large organizations: civilian agencies at all levels of government, large corporations, and nonprofit and civic organizations including unions and churches, to see whether some of the same principles are at play. I was particularly struck by one of Ricks' statements in the final section, the one about policy proposals. He says that it's probably too much to ask that intellectuals and those with differing viewpoints be favored for promotion during peacetime, but that efforts should be made to at least keep such men in the (military) organization during good times, because their insights are invaluable in wartime and when paradigms shift. It's a striking statement, and a troubling one. I'd be really interested to see more on this topic.