History has been kinder to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—than to the generals of the wars that followed. Is this merely nostalgia? Here, Thomas E. Ricks answers the question definitively: No, it is not, in no small part because of a widening gulf between performance and accountability.
During World War II, scores of American generals were relieved of command simply for not being good enough.
In The Generals we meet great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and those who failed themselves and their soldiers. Marshall and Eisenhower cast long shadows over this story, but no single figure is more inspiring than Marine General O. P. Smith, whose fighting retreat from the Chinese onslaught into Korea in 1950 snatched a kind of victory from the jaws of annihilation. But Smith’s courage and genius in the face of one of the grimmest scenarios the marines have ever faced only cast the shortcomings of the people who put him there in sharper relief.
If Korea showed the first signs of a culture that neither punished mediocrity nor particularly rewarded daring, the Vietnam War saw American military leadership bottom out. In the wake of Vietnam, a battle for the soul of the US Army was waged with impressive success. It became a transformed institution, reinvigorated from the bottom up. But if the body was highly toned, its head still suffered from familiar problems, resulting in tactically savvy but strategically obtuse leadership that would win battles but end wars badly.
Ricks has made a close study of America’s military leaders for three decades, and in his hands this story resounds with larger meaning: the transmission of values, strategic thinking, the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails. Military history of the highest quality, The Generals is also essential reading for anyone with an interest in the difference between good leaders and bad ones.
©2012 Thomas E. Ricks (P)2012 Blackstone Audio, Inc
"[A] savvy study of leadership in the US Army…Ricks presents an incisive, hard-hitting corrective to unthinking veneration of American military prowess." (Publishers Weekly)
"Thomas E. Ricks has written a definitive and comprehensive story of American generalship from the battlefields of World War II to the recent war in Iraq. The Generals candidly reveals their triumphs and failures, and offers a prognosis of what can be done to ensure success by our future leaders in the volatile world of the twenty-first century." (Carlo D’Este, author of Patton: A Genius for War)
"This is a brilliant book—deeply researched, very well-written, and outspoken. Ricks pulls no punches in naming names as he cites serious failures of leadership, even as we were winning World War II, and failures that led to serious problems in later wars. And he calls for rethinking the concept of generalship in the Army of the future." (William J. Perry, 19th US Secretary of Defense)
I could have listened to this in one sitting. You watch on TV the wars the US has going on and don't know what to make of all the problems they have concluding them. Was it inevitable? Is it incompetence? This book insightfully connects all the dots since WWII and talks about individual generals and and how they can excel or screw up based on who is running the army. A major point he makes is that in WWII commanders were replaced quickly if deemed incompetent. Nowadays no one is fired. Another point is commanders are taught to think tactically but not strategically. I'll probably reread this one.
I am an avid eclectic reader.
I found this book most interesting particularly the difference between Marine Corp leadership and the Army during the Korean War. Thomas Ricks compares the Army of WWII to the military of today, particularly looking at how General Marshall dealt with command officers compared to today.
General George C. Marshall was Chief of Staff during WWII and was ruthless in relieving subordinates who didn’t measure up to his standards. Between September 1939 and Dec 8, 1941 he cashiered at least 600 officers. Sixteen Army division commanders were relieved for cause out of a total of 155 officers who commanded divisions in combat during WWII. At least five Corps commanders were also relieved for cause. Marshall replaced them with officers like Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley and so on.
The author says that today the military is not policing its self. The only time an officer is removed is when the politicians intervene. For example the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Scandal or the Veterans Affairs Scandal is some current scandals that politicians have intervened in.
I found the comments by Ricks about the current Army’s upper command full of tactical planners and none trained as strategical planners. The author observation that the General staff is good at winning battles but unable to win the war is directly related to the lack of training in strategic thinking. I found a comment by Ricks about the military could easily apply to the business world, “training tends to prepare for the known problems, education prepares leaders to prepare for the unknown, the unpredictable, and the unexpected.”
Ricks sets out in the book to show how the Army has changed so dramatically in seventy years. Ricks ends the book with some suggestions for reform. The book is well written, deeply researched and pulls no punches. The book is narrated by William Hughes and lasts about 16 hours.
Yes, I have recommended this book to my friends and students. I teach a military education course to Air Force officers, and I think this is a fantastic book to spur some critical thought about how we develop and promote the personnel we have.
While this book focuses on Army generals, I think it is applicable to any of the services, and it potentially shows us why the Army should not be the lead service in our modern conflicts.
If you would like a preview of this book, you can look up Rick's article in the Atlantic called "General Failure." If you find it interesting in the least, then you will enjoy this book.
The author started with a great thesis- namely the decline of the Army Leadership by the Generals who have led the US both during and since World War II. He then did an excellent job supporting his position by offering great insight into all of the wars in which the army has been deployed- from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan. Portraits of all of the American Generals who commanded the US Army in these- Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, McArthur, Ridgeway, Taylor, Westmoreland, Abrams, Schwartzkopf, Powell, Franks, Petraeus, Sanchez, McCrystal are laid out here for the listener, as well as how each contribted to the success or failure of the army high command during these wars.
George Catlett Marshall- whom quite frankly not many people know enough about and appreciate today. Ricks portrays him as the father of what was great in the army during World War II- namely the ability to select men of high intelligence, energy and affability to lead the US forces- and to remove from command those generals who did not win battles. I became so fascinated by Ricks' portrait of Marshall that after listening to this recording I actually purchased and am reading a biography of Marshall from Amazon (Ed Cray's book entitled "General Of The Army"- which happens to be a great read so far) . Not many people actually realize it but Marshall wanted to command the Allied Invasion at Normandy in 1944- and it was at Franklin Roosevelt's request that he did not agree to become the commander and instead appointed Eisenhower- who as we all know won enough accolade and fame to eventually be elected President of the US.
All were decently portrayed
While I did not have an extreme reaction to the book, I must admit that I came away with the feeling that the current US Army command leadership structure needs to be reformed and new blood infused into that institution if the army is to be a relevant force in protecting the interests of our country. I believe that the author's recommendations on how to bring about and implement this change are well laid out in the epilogue to the book
I am glad that I purchased and listened to the book. While another reviewer has aptly pointed out that there is only theme to this book and that the author constantly reiterates it- I believe that book is well written and well narrated and worth the listen.
It's sometimes hard to say what makes a good non-fiction audiobook, but in my view, this book has that je ne sais quais. I found myself coming back to it, and putting aside other tasks I needed to get done so I could sit and listen to a book. It's a fascinating story that's pretty well summarized in the publisher's summary: in World War II, generals were relieved easily when it was felt this would aid the mission, and this was not a career ending event if the general had not screwed up egregiously. Today, generals are very rarely removed, and when they are, it's such an aberration that their careers are basically over. In today's military, failure is not punished, and as a corollary, success is not rewarded.
A high point of the book is the telling of the personnel story of the World War II army, an incredibly important story that I knew almost nothing about. George Marshall turns out to be one of the most influential Americans of the 20th century whose name you know, but not much else about him. He had tremendous influence over the military's leadership culture in ways large and small, and since most American men of that generation served in the military, he had great influence over how America was run for decades thereafter. The relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower is an interesting one that I knew little about. The figure who really comes off poorly here is Douglas MacArthur. Apparently the American Caeser was something of a buffoon, who unfortunately was a little too powerful for Marshall to dismiss the way he did most of the bungling pre-WWII military leadership.
How and why Marshall's recipe for military leadership ended up being discarded is the meat of the book, but a question that's never quite answered succinctly. Was Marshall's tragic flaw relying too much on his own moderating leadership at the top? Or did he engender too much respect for team players, a good short-run policy for winning a war but a bad long-term policy for maintaining an innovative culture. Ricks doesn't give us one simple answer. Another high point of the book though is Ricks' telling of the Vietnam story, and especially the difference between the army and the marines' outlook on counter-insurgency strategy (spoiler: the marines got it right, but the army was the far larger force).
It's not the most original part of the book, but Ricks makes a very forceful case that the post-Vietnam reforms were ultimately destructive to military competence, as the military focused purely on technical competency, afraid to tackle deeper questions of strategy and doctrine. It's a pretty damning indictment, and I'd be curious to hear a response from military leadership. One of Ricks' sharpest critiques is that the military hides its own failures by blaming civilian leaders, and declaring parts of its core responsibilities to be someone else's job. So the failure in Vietnam was one of civilians not letting the military win, and the Iraq War debacle was all the Bush administration's refusal to commit enough troops. During World War II, Ricks points out, George Marshall told the president what he needed to win, and if he hadn't gotten it, he was ready to resign. If civilian leaders have bungled our recent wars, including Desert Storm by failing to have any sort of plan for the endgame, they were aided and abetted by military leaders who saw their job as being entirely technical in nature, with overarching strategy questions always left to someone else.
If I would fault the book on anything it's that the thesis is actually pretty straightforward, and while the detail and case studies in the book are interesting, I'm not sure they're necessary to make Ricks' point. The argument might have more influence in a shorter magazine article, say. But I don't regret listening to the whole story in the least. I'd very much like to see Ricks take his insights to other large organizations: civilian agencies at all levels of government, large corporations, and nonprofit and civic organizations including unions and churches, to see whether some of the same principles are at play. I was particularly struck by one of Ricks' statements in the final section, the one about policy proposals. He says that it's probably too much to ask that intellectuals and those with differing viewpoints be favored for promotion during peacetime, but that efforts should be made to at least keep such men in the (military) organization during good times, because their insights are invaluable in wartime and when paradigms shift. It's a striking statement, and a troubling one. I'd be really interested to see more on this topic.
Haven't read the book. Just listened.
The whole book is memorable and sadly points out what else has gone to hell with the USA since WW2.
It's not meant to be filmed. Should be read and discussed.
A must read to explain the current failure of the once great American military that in the 40s destroyed Hitler and Tojo's minions in about 5 years compared to the sorry incompetents who lead America's military today. The book correctly points out that the fault is NOT with the enlisted serviceman we all rightly honor and respect [well most of them] but the sorry excuses for generals leading them since the Korean War. Reward failure and you get what we have now, ten years of incompetence and an Afghanistan that is in worse shape than it was six months after 9/11 when at least the Taliban was momentarily beaten. The book should be read by every American who gives a damn about the USA. Next book by this author should be "The teachers" another sad story of incompetence thanks this time mostly to the teacher's union. Incompetent teachers are even harder to fire than incompetent generals. The administrators of our failed education system should be fired en masse.
I served 20 years in the military before I retired. I served in Vietnam and worked in joint commands so am quite familiar with the Army, Navy and Marines. I would like to think this makes my comments of more value than someone less familiar with the military.
This book is a no holds barred on the US Army officer corps and especially the generals. This book also parallels the American society degradation from accountability for your actions. This is a must read for anyone who wants to be in a managerial, leadership, or military role.
This was a good, but not expert analysis. As a spectator to some of the events, I would have liked to hear about the transition in the relationship between GEN Petraeus and GEN Odierno. Missed completely. Not much balance in the critique of civil versus military leadership. While I expect many excuses from the author, the bottom line is that this is an amateurish work.
Thomas Ricks in this book is making the case that after WWII the army stopped relieving generals from command positions which made them less accountable. He is attributing all the failures in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq to this issue.
The book starts with the assertion that General George Marshal in WWII created a template for winning generals and that he relieved generals that didn't live to that expectation.The book moves to show that this stopped after WWII and caused a lot of the setbacks the army faced in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. The book concludes by urging army leaders to return back to that policy.
I agree with some of the points the book made especially that generals should be held accountable and relieved from command when they fail to achieve the objectives. The problem I think is that the presidents failed to make a clear case and determine the objective for each of the Korea, Vietnam and Iraq wars. The book mentions some of that when it covers the political games Johnson did to get around the chiefs of staff.
Another issue with the book is that the author is making the case for a successful general template developed by Marshal but in reality there were a number of successful WWII generals who didn't fit that template such as Patton and Terry Allen and there were generals who fit it but were proved not to be stellar leaders such as Omar Bradley and Maxwell Taylor.
The author also attacked General MacArthur mainly because he had political ambitions not because of military issues during WWII. He then used MacArthur's failure to predict the Chinese intervention in Korea to further attack him although he mentioned that the CIA didn't believe the Chinese were going to intervene either.
I think that the book provides a good history but I think that there were much deeper problems that caused the struggle in the mentioned 3 wars than just the failure of generals.
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